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Introduction
It is said that the world is growing smaller.

Global trade is

increasing-indeed, much of the success of the United States'
economy currently relies on trade.' One increasingly important
aspect of global trade is intellectual property: patents, copyrights and
trademarks. Companies trading around the world seek protection for

their goods and their brands from appropriation by competitors and
others. However, in an increasingly interconnected world the laws
that govern the transmittal of information, and the protection of
intellectual property, often remained isolated. They are the products

of national boundaries and even, in some cases, the products of
subdivisions of those nations But this is changing? The North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) required Canada, the
United States, and Mexico to harmonize some of their laws governing
intellectual property to facilitate free trade.' The General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) contains provisions requiring
signatories to conform to certain minimum standards as well.' The
European Community is attempting to harmonize the laws of its
member nations.6 And the United States gradually has been changing
its laws to match those of other nations more closely.!
1. See Evelyn Iritani, Trade Pacts Accused of Subverting U.S. Policies;
Commerce, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 28, 1999, at Al (noting that many Fortune 500
companies rely heavily on foreign trade).
2. The prime examples of the latter, of course, are the constituent states of the
United States. But our situation is hardly unique. Canada's provinces also have
individual laws and regulations, as do the states of Mexico, and the constituent parts
of the United Kingdom-England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland.
3. See Marshall A. Leaffer, The New World of InternationalTrademark Law, 2
MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1998).
4. See North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Subtitle
C-Intellectual Property, Pub. L. No. 103-182, 107 Stat. 2114 (1993).
5. See Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade. This agreement, known by the acronym TRIPS, was implemented in the
United States by Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809, Title V. See generally Leaffer,
supra note 3.
6. See First Council Directive 89/104/EEC of 21 December 1988 to
Approximate the Laws of the Member States Relating to Trade Marks [hereinafter
Directive].
7. See, e.g., Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-667, 102 Stat.
3935 (allowing, inter alia, intent to use applications); Trademark Law Treaty
Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 105-330, 112 Stat. 3064 (1998); Federal Trademark
Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat. 985 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §
1125(c) (1996)); Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298,
112 Stat. 2827 (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 302-04 (1998)). It appears that the United
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Few practitioners with outward looking clients can stay ignorant
of international trends. But despite the moves toward
homogenization, the laws of separate nations remain different, and
important. Trademark law in particular historically has been very
territorially oriented. That is, countries tend to view trademark law
as protecting marks that are used within the country, pursuant to local
law. Although the communications revolution may force changes, it
is still important to know how each country will treat the issues
involved in trademark protection. This Article illustrates the dual
forces of harmonization and national differences in one small corner
of the intellectual property world: a recent trend in the law of
trademark protection. As global trade grows, trademarks-brand
identities-carry the flag, so to speak, of products, companies, and
even countries.9 Obviously, the vast array of countries and laws
makes a global discussion difficult. This discussion will focus on the
common law friends of the United States, namely, Great Britain and
Canada, and will analyze primarily one aspect of trademark law:
infringement without confusion. This aspect of trademark law is
representative of the trend toward increasing protection not just of
the brands, but of information itself. Moreover, it illustrates the dual
impulses of international harmonization and national regulation with
national differences. As will be seen, although each of the countries
purports to protect trademarks against non-confusing second users,
the traditions of each country result in somewhat different types of
protection.
British law is further complicated by Britain's
membership in the European Community, which mandates a degree
of harmonization of the laws among its member countries."0
States is on the verge of joining a major international agreement, the Madrid
Protocol. See EU to Consult With U.S. Over Any Votes on Trademark Issues Under
Madrid Protocol,59 PTCJ (BNA) 606 (Feb. 25,2000); Resolution of EU Voting Issue
Dislodges Stalled TrademarkTreaty Bill, 59 PTCJ (BNA) 573 (Feb. 18,2000).
8. See, e.g., Person's Co. v. Christman, 900 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (holding
that first user in United States entitled to priority, even when he knows of prior user
in Japan); Athlete's Foot Mktg. Assoc. Inc. v. Cobra Sports Ltd. [1980] R.P.C. 343,
350 (Ch. 1979); see also Leaffer, supra note 3, at 7-9 (predicting a decline in
territoriality).
9. Who could deny that Coca-Cola, for good or ill, is a symbol of an American
company, not just a company that sells soda?
10. See generally Directive, supra note 6. It also means that the European Court
of Justice plays an important role in the interpretation of national laws. See Treaty
Establishing the European Community, art. 177 (consolidated and renumbered as
Art. 234) [hereinafter Treaty of Rome]; see also Sabel BV v. Puma AG [1998] 1
C.M.L.R. 445 (ECJ 1997) (originating in Germany, but interpreting a key term
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The purpose of this Article is twofold: awareness and
comparison. First, it is intended to make the U.S. audience more
aware of an area of law that is burgeoning in this country and could
well become a major aspect of trademark law in other countries.
Second, the Article takes on a comparative role. It points out various
ways in which the laws of the two countries are similar to, and
different from, their U.S. counterparts. In doing so, we will find an
interesting fact: sometimes procedure can be as important to
protection as substance. This will require a short excursion into the
practical differences between the way some systems enforce the
substance of trademark law.
Part I presents a brief introduction to the primary subject of
discussion: trademark infringement without confusion, its origins and
current state of statutory and common law protection in different
countries. Part II discusses the state of the law in the United
Kingdom," and Part III discusses the law in Canada. Hopefully, this
discussion can be a catalyst for further examinations of comparative
trademark law.
I. Trademark Infringement Without Confusion:
A (Very) Short Course
Though at least a passing familiarity of the reader with
trademark nomenclature is assumed, I will first present a short
description of the general problem at hand. As students and
practitioners of trademark law are aware, the traditional linchpin of
trademark infringement is the likelihood that the use by a second
person of a mark'2 that is the same as or similar to a mark already
used by another will cause confusion among the consuming public. 3
By protecting against confusion, trademark law protects consumers
included in Britain's law).
11. At the risk of possible inaccuracy (and ruffled sensibilities), I will often use
"Britain" or "Great Britain" to refer to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and

Northern Ireland. I hope that this does not distract readers from the points made.
12. By "mark" I mean a symbol, word, device, etc., that serves to distinguish the
goods or services of one person from those of another. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127
(definition of "trademark").
13. See J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 23:1 ("'Likelihood of confusion' is the basic test of both common-law
trademark infringement and federal statutory infringement.").
In simplified
parlance, "confusion" means that the consumer thinks that Company B's goods are
really Company A's goods, or that Company B's goods are somehow connected with,
or approved or authorized by, Company A.
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against deceptive sales practices, and businesses against unfair
competitive practices. Over the years, the ambit of "confusion" has
expanded beyond confusion of goods and source (you buy Company
A's widget, thinking it is the one made by Company B), to confusion
of sponsorship (you know that Company A does not make widgets,
but you think it may approve of this one or licensed someone to use
its name) and even "post sale" confusion (the buyer is not confused
about who makes or sponsors the product, but people seeing the item
in the buyer's home are confused about its source). This expansion of
what constitutes actionable confusion gives mark owners considerable
protection against unauthorized uses of the mark.
But another form of trademark protection, giving even more
protection to mark owners, has become popular recently. That form
of protection is known as trademark "dilution." Trademark dilution
is based not on the notion of protecting consumers from deception,
but on protecting mark owners from a possible diminution in the
value of their marks. The theory of dilution, usually traced to a
HarvardLaw Review article by Frank Schechter,'4 is that a second use
of a well-known mark, even where the second use does not confuse
consumers, gradually erodes the unique symbolism of that mark.
Over time, many such uses erode the unique connection between a
well-known mark and goods produced by the mark's owner. Once
that connection is partially severed by the presence of other (usually
non-competing or non-similar) goods with the same brand name, the
value of the trademark as a marketing device is eroded." Dilution
proponents have cited these as potential examples of diluting uses of
14. See Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40

HARV. L. REv. 813 (1927).
15. This has been termed the "whittling away" of the marketing power of the

trademark. As the law now stands, it also protects against other uses that could harm
the marketing power of a trademark, such as association with unsavory messages.
See, e.g., American Express Co. v. Vibra Approved Lab. Corp., 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
2006 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1183
(E.D.N.Y. 1972). This is known as trademark "tarnishment." In the spirit of full
disclosure, I should concede that, in my view, dilution is based on tenuous
assumptions and represents an unnecessary extension of traditional trademark law.
See generally David S. Welkowitz, Reexamining Trademark Dilution, 44 VAND. L.
REV. 531 (1991). For other views of dilution, see MCCARTHY § 24:114 at 24-207 n.1
(citing numerous articles); Kenneth L. Port, The "Unnatural" Expansion of
TrademarkRights: Is a FederalDilution Statute Necessary?, 85 TRADEMARK REP. 525
(1995); Rudolf Callmann, Unfair Competition Without Competition?, 95 U. PA. L.
REV. 443 (1947); TONY MARTINO, TRADEMARK DILUTION (1996) (discussion of

dilution in the United States and the U.K., as well as other countries, by a British
commentator).
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a mark: Buick candy bars, Kodak laundry detergent, and the like. In
contrast to ordinary trademark infringement, dilution is not
predicated on any showing of likelihood of confusion. The injury is
the reduced marketing value of the mark, rather than confusion in the
marketplace.
Dilution protection could have important implications for global
trade.
Proponents of trademark exclusivity-that is, strong
protection against any unauthorized uses of a mark-assert that such
protection facilitates worldwide brand recognition and may reduce
search costs for goods for consumers in other countries.'6 Opponents
of such exclusivity can assert that such broad protection may hamper
effective entry into the market and reduce competition (particularly if
protection extends to comparative advertising of a mark), and that it
may preclude parodies and other socially desirable means of
communication. Protection from dilution also may be viewed as an
overly broad response to the brand equity problem, arguably making
it too easy for mark owners to win weak infringement suits.'7
Although the theory of dilution has been around for a long time,
its progression into the mainstream of trademark law in the United
States and other countries has been uneven. Until 1996, trademark
dilution in the United States was the province of state law.'8 In that

year, the Federal Trademark Dilution Act (FTDA) became effective,
creating federal dilution protection for "famous" trademarks. 9

In Britain, statutory recognition of trademark infringement
without confusion occurred when Parliament passed a comprehensive
16. See Leaffer, supra note 3, at 5 & n.17.
17. In part, the level of opposition to dilution may depend on what percentage of
trademarks are eligible for dilution protection. Under the FTDA, for instance, a
mark must be "famous" to qualify for protection. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c). In those
states that have laws protecting against dilution, most courts have interpreted the
statute to require that the mark be fairly well known to be protected by state law.
See McCARTHY § 24:108. Many states have recently amended their statutes to
require the mark to be famous.
18. Massachusetts passed the first trademark dilution law in 1947. See Act of
May 2, 1947, ch. 307, § 7a, 1947 Mass. Acts 300 (codified at Mass. Gen. Laws Ann.,
ch. ll0B, § 12). But it was not until the late 1970s, particularly with the decision in
Allied Maintenance Corp. v. Allied Mechanical Trades, Inc., 42 N.Y.2d 538, 369
N.E.2d 1162, 399 N.Y.S.2d 628 (1977), that dilution claims began to be commonplace.
In Allied, New York's highest court made clear that the state trademark dilution
statute meant exactly what it said-it permitted a suit even without a showing of
likelihood of confusion. See id. at 543-45, 369 N.E.2d at 1165-66, 399 N.Y.S.2d at 63132.
19. See Lanham Act § 43(c), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c).
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new trademark statute in 1994. The Trade Marks Act of 1994 ("1994

Act") included sections that appear to provide such protection' The
relatively new and untested laws of the U.K. and United States
provide a particularly interesting point of comparison as the courts of
each country seek to give meaning to the new statutory provisions.
Canada has had a statutory provision since 1953 allowing for
However, the first major
infringement without confusion.
interpretation of that statute did not come until 1968,' and its
protective reach still is uncertain'
How each country deals with this issue may provide important
insights into the evolution of their respective intellectual property
rights in general. Cultural and legal historical norms also may play an
interesting role in determining the breadth of trademark protection in
individual countries. Although trademark historically is a consumer
protection or unfair competition issue, a principle that permits
significant exclusivity rights begins to look more like a property
theory. Thus, the study of dilution may be a window to the future of
intellectual property.
With this rather brief introduction behind us, let us move into a
more detailed discussion of the dilution laws of Britain and Canada.
H. The British Experience: Confusion Reigns
There are really three eras of British trademark law that one
might discuss. First is the period before the 1938 statute, when
common law unfair competition provided the basic principles.' Next
20. This statute was prompted by its membership in the European Union, which

directed that member states attempt to approximate their trademark laws in order to
facilitate free trade among the countries. See Directive, supra note 6.
21. See Trade Marks Act, 1994, §§ 5(3), 10(3) (Eng.) [hereinafter "1994 Act"]. I
say "appear to provide" because the few decisions under the new law have not
produced a consistent interpretation of the extent of protection provided. See infra
Part I.B.

22. See R.S.C., c. T-13, § 22(1) (1985) (Can.).
23. See Clairol Int'l Corp. v. Thomas Supply & Equip. Co. [1968] 2 Ex. C.R. 552,
38 Fox Pat. 176 [1968].
24. See discussion infra, Part III.A.
25. The 1938 statute was not the first British trademark statute. There were
several preceding statutes. See T. A. BLANCO WHITE & ROBIN JACOB, KERLY'S LAW
OF TRADE MARKS AND TRADE NAMES Appendices 6-8 (12th ed. 1986) (showing
three previous major statutes: Trade Marks Registration Acts §§ 1875-77, 38 & 39
Vict., ch. 91; Patents, Designs and Trade Marks Act § 1883, 46 & 47 Vict., ch. 57;
Trade Marks Act 1905, Edw. 7, ch. 15 (this latter statute was amended in 1914 and
1919)) [hereinafter KIuY].
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is the period from the 1938 Trade Marks Act to its replacement with
the 1994 Trade Marks Act. Finally, there is the period from 1994 to
the present, in which the 1994 Act provides the predominant basis for
trademark infringement law.'
This third period is also critical
because it marks the attempt to harmonize British trademark law
with that of the European Union. There are several important
consequences of this harmonization process. One is that Britain's
common law experience may not mesh easily with the European civil
law tradition. Another is that, as a member of the European Union,
Britain now must follow the rulings of the European Court of Justice
when it interprets European Union law. As we shall see, this may
have a profound effect on the development of British trademark law,
and, in particular, trademark dilution law.
For convenience sake, we shall divide the discussion of British
law into just two periods-the pre-1994 and post-1994 periods. The
main focus will be the experience under the 1994 statute, for that is
where the future of the trademark dilution claim lies. However, the
pre-1994 period provides useful background for understanding the
results already reached under the 1994 statute. Therefore, we will
begin with an abbreviated discussion of that pre-1994 period-both
statutory (under the 1938 Act) and non-statutory.
A. The Pre-1994 Experience
One can trace a form of trademark dilution in the United
Kingdom to the 19th-century.Y However, that casen involving a
famous trademark (Kodak) used by a second user on very disparate
goods (bicycles) from the original, was decided, at least formally, on
the familiar grounds of confusion and passing off. 9 When the Trade
Marks Act of 1938, predecessor to the current United Kingdom
trademark statute, was enacted, it did not protect trademarks without

26. The common law action for "passing off" still exists and provides protection
for trademarks that are not registered under the 1994 statute. See United Biscuits
(UK) Ltd. v. Asda Stores Ltd. [1997] R.P.C. 513 (Ch. 1997). The essence of this
action is that one company is using some device to "pass off" its goods as the goods of
another, thereby deceiving the consumer. This action will be discussed in more detail
infra Part III.D.2.
27. See MARTINO, supra note 15, at 4 n.1 (citing Eastman Photographic Materials
Co. Ltd. v. John Griffith's Cycle Corp., 15 R.P.C. 105 (1898) and Walter v. Ashton, 2
Ch. 282 (1902)).
28. And a similar one decided a few years later. See Eastman, 15 R.P.C. 105.
29. See id.
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a showing of confusion.' Nevertheless, some cases post-dating the
1938 Act can be found that uphold dilution-lik&' arguments. The
1938 Act did not preempt the common law tort of passing off, and it is
under that rubric that we find some support for a dilution claim.
Perhaps the most prominent case is TaittingerS.A. v. Allbev, Ltd.,32 a
suit by producers of French champagne from the Champagne district
against the maker of a sparkling non-alcoholic drink called
"Elderflower Champagne." This case was a common law action for
passing off, rather than statutory trademark infringement.3 In their
discussions of the passing off claim, all three judges of the Court of
Appeal agreed that the essence of the damage to plaintiff was the
dilution or blurring of the exclusive connotation of the term
"champagne" with wine from the French Champagne region.'
Peter Gibson, L.J., began with an extended discussion of the tort
of passing off, focusing on the deceit or confusion aspects of the
action, and concluded that confusion was likely. But then he
continued as follows:
But in my judgment the real injury to the champagne houses'
goodwill comes under a different head .... [Plaintiffs counsel] had
argued that if the defendants continued to market their product,
there would take place a blurring or erosion of the uniqueness that
now attends the word "champagne," so that the exclusive
reputation of the champagne houses would be debased. He put this
even more forcefully before us. He submitted that if the
defendants are allowed to continue to call their product
30. The Eastman case referred to above did engender a section 27 in the 1938 Act
on "defense of registration," permitting certain "invented" marks to be registered for
goods on which they were not used. See KERLY, supra note 25, § 8-82 at 135.
31. I say "dilution-like," rather than "dilution" primarily because the cases are
decided expressly on a passing off rationale, which is really grounded in deceit, or at
least some sort of confusion (even if confusion of sponsorship).
32. [1994] 4 All E.R. 75, [1993] F.S.R. 641 (C.A. (Civil) 1993).
33. It also included a claim under a European Council regulation relating to the
use of the term "champagne." See id. at 79. The judges also upheld plaintiff's
contention that the regulation had been violated. See id. at 90-91, 95.
34. Sir Thomas Bingham, M.R., did state that the major issue was whether "a risk
of confusion" existed. Id. at 94. Nevertheless, he based his agreement with his fellow
judges on the same ground-dilution-as their arguments. It should be noted that all
three judges accepted a formulation for passing off set forth by Lord Diplock in
Erven Warnick BV v. Townend & Sons (Hull) [1979] 2 All E.R. 927, 932-33 (H.L.
1979), [1979] App. Cas. 731, 742 (appeal taken from C.A.). The last two elements in
that test are for misrepresentations "calculated to injure the business or goodwill of
another" and which cause such injury. Taittinger at 82 (quoting Warnick at 932-33).
The judges viewed dilution as an injury to the plaintiffs' goodwill.
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Elderflower Champagne, the effect would be to demolish the
distinctiveness of the word champagne, and that would inevitably
damage the goodwill of the champagne houses.
In the Advocaat case... Goulding, J., held that one type of
damage was "a more gradual damage to the plaintiffs' business
through depreciation of the reputation that their goods enjoy." He
continued: Damage of [this] type can rarely be susceptible of
positive proof ....

It seems to me inevitable that if the defendants, with their not
insignificant trade as a supplier of drinks to Sainsbury [a large
grocery chain in Britain] and other retail outlets, are permitted to
use the name Elderflower Champagne, the goodwill in the
distinctive name champagne will be eroded with serious adverse
consequences for the champagne houses. 6
This language is that of dilution, not traditional confusion. Though
the judge already had concluded that traditional confusion existed, his
extended discussion of the potential damage to goodwill shows the
influence of dilution concepts on the decision.
Similarly, when discussing the element of likely damage
(necessary to support an injunction here), Mann, L.J. wrote:
Their case was and is, that the word "Champagne" has an
exclusiveness which is impaired if it is used in relation to a product
(particularly a potable product) which is neither Champagne nor
associated or connected with the businesses which produce
Champagne. The impairment is a gradual debasement, dilution or
erosion of what is distinctive (compare Sir Robin Cooke P.,
Wineworths Group Ltd. v. CIV [1992] 2 NZLR 327 at 332). The
consequences of debasement, dilution or erosion are not
demonstrable in figures of lost sales but that they will be
incrementally damaging to goodwill is in my opinion inescapable.
On this basis I would grant injunctive relief as claimed."
Even though these statements were made in a context of traditional
confusion, the link to dilution theory is clear.
However, the Taittinger rationale was not readily extended to
non-confusing uses of another's mark. In HarrodsLtd. v. Harrodian
School Ltd., the Court of Appeal denied relief to the Harrods
35. Id. at 87.

36. Id. at 88.
37. Taittinger at 91.
38. [1996] R.P.C. 697 (Court of Appeal).
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department store in a suit against a private school called the
"Harrodian School.

'39

Discussing Taittinger,Millett, L.J., noted that

"unless care is taken[, the concept of damage to goodwill as sufficient
proof of confusion] could mark an unacceptable extension to the tort
of passing off."' He went on to say, "I have an intellectual difficulty
in accepting the concept that the law insists upon the presence of both
confusion and damage yet recognizes as sufficient a head of damage
which does not depend on confusion.""1 He then accepted the trial
judge's finding of no likelihood of confusion, and refused relief. 2 But
both Taittinger and Harrods Ltd. were common law actions for
passing off. Not until recently was there a statutory basis for dilution

protection.
B. A New Statute and New Expectations
In 1994, the British Parliament passed a new Trade Marks Act,
replacing the one in effect since 1938. As major reforms of
intellectual property laws are not particularly commonplace, one
might ask what prompted the Parliament to overhaul its law. Simply
stated, the cause was Britain's membership in the European
Community. In late 1988, the Council of the European Community'3
issued a directive requiring member countries to harmonize their
trademark laws." The Council's concern was that widely disparate
laws could hamper trade within the common market. Member states
were required to "comply with this Directive not later than 28
December 1991;""' obviously, the U.K. was rather late.' When the
39. Notably, the school occupied a building formerly used by the Harrodian Club,
a private club of Harrods employees.
40. Harrodsat 697.
41. Id. Oddly, he seemed also to believe that dilution constituted genericidethat is, making the mark generic.
42 See id. at 717-18. Beldham, L.J., also upheld the trial judge's refusal of relief
on the ground of no confusion. See id. at 732. Sir Michael Kerr dissented. He would
have credited the Taittinger analysis, at least in so far as a cheapening of the mark's
reputation is an actionable form of damage. See id. at 719.
43. Now the Council of the European Union.
44. See Directive, supra note 6. Directives are issued by the Council of the
European Union, a legislative body. They act, in effect, as legal mandates to the
members of the EU under the treaties governing the union. In the case of the
trademarks Directive, some of the provisions were mandatory-that is, all members
were obliged to enact them in substance into national law-while other provisions
were not.
45. Directive, supra note 6, art. 16(1).
46. Article 16(2) of the Directive permitted the Council to postpone the date
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reform bill finally came up for debate in Parliament, its supporters
urged the members not to tamper with the key language, taken

almost verbatim from the Directive.47 They were concerned that
changes could cause Britain's law to be inconsistent with that of other

E.C. countries. This fear even extended to non-mandatory portions
of the Directive.'

This argument was accepted and the 1994 law

largely tracks the Directive. 49 As a result, some key language is both

ambiguous and unfamiliar to British law.
With regard to trademark dilution, most of the crucial language
from the Directive is contained in sections 10(2) and 10(3) of the 1994
Act."0 Let us examine that language more closely, beginning with
section 10(2):
(2) A person infringes a registered trade mark if he uses in the
course of trade a sign where because
(a) the sign is identical with the trade mark and is used in relation
to goods or services similar to those for which the trade mark is
registered, or
(b) the sign is similar to the trade mark and is used in relation to
goods or services identical with or similar to those for which the
trade mark is registered, there exists a likelihood of confusion on
the part of the public, which includes the likelihood of association

until Dec. 31, 1992, but Britain did not even comply with that deadline. However, no
direct sanctions for such failure were provided for in the Directive. For a discussion
of this issue, see generally Dinah Nissen & Ian Karet, The Trade Marks Directive:
Can I Prevail if the State Has Failed? [1993] 3 E.I.P.R. 91 (discussing, inter alia,

possible invocation of the Treaty of Rome to provide a remedy).
47. See MARTINO, supra note 15, at 86, 103.
48. Not all portions of the Directive requiredcertain standards. To some degree,
the Directive permitted countries to implement certain features at their discretion.
These features were listed in a statutory format in the Directive so that countries
could, if they wished, adopt a standard format. See, e.g., Directive, supra note 6, art.
5(2) (allowing countries to protect non-similar goods from infringement in the form
of taking unfair advantage of the first mark's goodwill).
49. See, e.g., Anselm Kamperman Sanders, Some Frequently Asked Questions
About the 1994 UK Trade Marks Act [1995] 2 E.I.P.R. 67, 69 n.20; see also Baywatch
Prod. Co. Inc. v. Home Video Channel [1997] F.S.R. 22,27 (Ch. 1996).
50. Section 10 defines the circumstances of trademark infringement. Sections
10(2) and 10(3) set forth perhaps the most common circumstances, though by no
means the only ones. As will be seen, section 5 of the 1994 Act designates the
circumstances under which registrationof a mark may be denied. Sections 5(2) and
5(3), in relevant part, mimic the language of sections 10(2) and 10(3), respectively.
Thus, cases interpreting sections 10(2) and 10(3) can be used to interpret sections
5(2) and 5(3) and vice versa.
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with the trade mark."S
Putting aside the issue of "uses in the course of trade,"52 we will

begin with the language that limits the applicability of section 10(2) to
an offending mark used on "identical" goods or "similar" goods to
the ones listed in the registration.53 As discussed below, the next

section, section 10(3), only applies where the goods are not similar.
Thus, the infringement portion of the statute creates two seemingly

non-overlapping categories-infringement by the same or similar
goods, and infringement by non-similar goods-with separate
standards for infringement. This is a change from the 1938 Act. This
distinction between the infringement standard for similar vs. nonsimilar goods is not only "foreign" from a British standpoint, it is, at
least formally, a concept not found in American trademark law. '
Because section 10(2) contains the traditional test for trademark
infringement-likelihood of confusion-it would appear that the
statute only imposes that requirement in similar goods situations.5

51. One commentator has written a detailed analysis of the language of section
10(3) (including language common to sections 10(2) and 10(3)). See MARTINO, supra
note 15. I recommend his text to readers desiring more discussion. See id. at 88-120.
52. Somewhat similar phraseology existed in the 1938 Act. See MARTINO, supra
note 15, at 91. This phrase is common to sections 10(2) and 10(3).
53. 1994 Act, subsections 10(2)(a), 10(2)(b). Subsection (a) only applies to
similar goods, but applies when the infringer uses the identical mark.
54. The portion of the Lanham Act (i.e., the United States federal trademark
statute) relating to infringement (Lanham Act, § 32, 15 U.S.C. § 1114) requires a
showing of confusion, regardless of the similarity or lack thereof between the goods
of the parties. Section 43(c), which protects marks against dilution, also does not
require that the offending goods be either similar or dissimilar. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c).
However, the courts have developed specialized multifactor tests for confusion to be
used when the goods of the two parties are non-competing. See, e.g., Polaroid Corp.
v. Polarad Elect. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961). On the other hand, the
Second Circuit has adopted the multifactor test even in cases of competing goods.
See Thompson Med. Co., Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc., 753 F.2d 208, 214 (2d Cir. 1985); see
Libman Co. v. Vining Ind., Inc., 69 F.3d 1360, 1364-65 (7th Cir. 1995) (multifactor
test).
55. In Baywatch, at 30-31, the court required a likelihood of confusion in a nonsimilar goods case. Cf Oasis Stores Ltd. [1998] R.P.C. 631, 641-52 (Trade Marks
Registry) (apparently rejecting the Baywatch approach, yet still rejecting opposition
by makers of EVEREADY batteries to the registration of EVEREADY for
condoms). One might ask where cases of non-similar goods causing confusion would
fall. Presumably, the strictures of section 10(3) would apply in those cases. However,
section 10(3) requires that the offending use either take "unfair advantage of' the
mark or be "detrimental to [its] distinctive character or repute." Conceivably, a
confusingly similar mark on disparate goods would not take unfair advantage of the
registered mark. But, in most cases, one would expect courts to find a violation of
section 10(3) in that circumstance. In Canon Kabushiki Kaisha v. Metro-Goldwyn-

Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.

[Vol. 24:63

American trademark law has developed refinements of the confusion
doctrine that extend its reach even into dissimilar goods cases. For
example, several cases have granted relief on a theory of "confusion
of sponsorship," where, although consumers understand that the
offending goods do not originate with the trademark owner, they may
believe that the trademark owner licensed or otherwise approved of
the offending use. 6 The goods in these American cases tend to be
completely dissimilar to those on which the trademark owner places
the mark. Thus, section 10(2) apparently would not cover such
situations. If they are to be found infringing, it must be done under
section 10(3), the "dilution" section, or under a common law passing
off theory.
Whether British law prior to the 1994 Act recognized "confusion
of sponsorship" (or some analogous theory) to the same extent as
American law is, at the very least, a murky issue. One might, for
example, read the Taittinger case above as supporting such a theory,
although it purported to follow a more dilution-like approach.
However, HarrodsLtd. v. HarrodianSchool Ltd.,7 a more recent case
involving common law passing off, raises serious doubts as to the use
of sponsorship confusion. In that case, discussed briefly earlier, Lord
Justice Millett stated.
It is not in my opinion sufficient to demonstrate that there must be
a connection of some kind between the defendant and the plaintiff,
if it is not a connection which would lead the public to suppose that
the plaintiff has made himself responsible for the quality of the
defendant's goods or services. A belief that the plaintiff has
sponsored or given financial support to the defendant will not
ordinarily give the public that impression.
This seems to be a complete rejection of the American concept of
Mayer, Inc., Case C-39/97, (1998), the ECJ stated that the "similarity" required may
vary inversely with the distinctiveness of the first mark. Id.
19, 24. If followed in
the U.K., this could allow somewhat disparate goods to fall under section 10(2). See
discussion infra notes 79-108, 173, 174. Cf. British Sugar PLC v. James Robertson &
Sons, Ltd. [1996] R.P.C. 281 (Ch. 1996) (treating issue of similarity as separate from
distinctiveness).
56. Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200,
210-11 (2d Cir. 1979); see also Boston Prof'1 Hockey Assn., Inc. v. Dallas Cap &
Emblem Mfg., Inc., 510 F.2d 1004, 1012 (5th Cir. 1979); Nat'l Football League v.
Governor of the State of Delaware, 435 F. Supp. 1372, 1380-81 (D. Del. 1977).
57. [1996] R.P.C. 697 (Ct. of Appeal 1996).
58. Id. at 713. The concurring judge, Beldham, L.J., appeared to agree with these
sentiments. See id. at 731.
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sponsorship confusion." If the Harrodsmajority correctly stated the
law, then the new statute, which seems not to include confusion of
sponsorship (because the goods would not be similar) does not
radically alter the law as it existed. The issue of similarity will be
discussed later. For now, let us focus on other language that brings us
to the central issue: Can there be trademark infringement without
confusion?'
Section 10(2) contains other, murkier language that has stirred
up quite a bit of debate about the possible use of section 10(2) in nonconfusion situations. The section first requires "likelihood of
confusion," which is not a new concept. The language that follows is
the new addition. It defines confusion as "includ[ing] the likelihood
of association with the trade mark."6' This language has been the
subject of a good deal of commentary, as well as judicial opinion. The
question is whether this language extends the protection in similar
goods cases to situations outside of what one ordinarily calls
"confusion," namely, where the offending use "calls to mind" the
registered use. Such "calling to mind" would, in effect, incorporate
dilution into this section of the statute.' The argument in favor of the
expansive reading centers on the trademark law of the Benelux
countries. The language in section 10(2), which is taken from the
Directive, is derived from Benelux trademark law.' Benelux law uses
this language broadly to prohibit unauthorized uses that "call to

59. The dissent, however, appeared to accept some form of confusion of
sponsorship: "[S]ome assumed [by the public] commercial, or even philanthropic,
connection linking the plaintiffs to [defendant's] school appears to me to be quite
sufficient [to show confusion]." Id. at 721. The dissent cites an old case, Ewing v.
Buttercup MargarineCo., opining that confusion is shown if "people... conclude that
the defendants are really connected with the plaintiffs... , or in some way mixed up
with them." [1917] 34 R.P.C. 232,237.
60. See infra notes 151-64 and accompanying text.
61. 1994 Act § 10(2). Obviously, such language could be deemed to include
confusion of sponsorship. However, the requirement of section 10(2) that the goods
be similar would seriously limit the use of that doctrine.
62- See, e.g., Sanders, supra note 49, at 70 ("It must therefore be that by inclusion

of association an elaboration on the confusion criterion is envisaged. This leads to
the position that section 10(2) incorporates both the source and the dilution
doctrine... ."); see also Paul Harris, UK Trade Mark Law: Are You Confused?
[1995] 12 E.I.P.R. 601, 601; Peter Prescott, Has the Benelux Trade Mark Law Been

Written into the Directive? [1997] 3 E.I.P.R. 99, 99-100; Mark Elmslie, The New UK
Trade Marks Bill [1994] 3 E.I.P.R. 119,121-22.
63. Belgium, Netherlands, and Luxembourg.
64. See Elmslie, supra note 62, at 121.
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mind" the registered mark, even when there is no confusion. '
However, the argument for an expansive reading has not fared
well in the courts. First was the decision in Wagamama Ltd. v. City
Centre Restaurants PLC.' The case pitted a Japanese restaurant
called "Wagamama" against an Indian restaurant named
"Rajamama." Plaintiff claimed entitlement to relief under two
theories, both based on section 10(2).67 First, it claimed what the
court called "classic" confusion, or confusion of source. And the
court eventually decided that a classic case of confusion-or passing
off-had been made out.' Before that, however, the court engaged in
a lengthy discussion of the argument for expansive interpretation of
the section under the "calling to mind" rationale.69

The short of it is, the court rejected the expansive interpretation
of section 10(2). The court first determined that, on its face, the
statute should not be construed expansively. Because the language
originated in the Directive, not Parliament, the court rejected the
argument that the added phrase must have been intended to expand

the "classical" scope of confusion, i.e., source confusion.' The court
then considered, and rejected, the argument that the Directive
intended to incorporate the Benelux interpretation of the phrase

"likelihood of association."'" Although Benelux case law did elicit the
expansive interpretation, the court was not persuaded that the
remaining E.C. membership accepted the Benelux interpretation as
65. Id.; see also Harris, supra note 62, at 601.
66. [1995] F.S.R. 713 (Ch. 1995).
67. The services of the two parties-restaurants-obviously were considered
"similar" within the meaning of section 10(2). Cf. Baywatch Prod. Co. (finding
pornographic television show "Babewatch" not similar goods to "action" television
show Baywatch-registration classification for Baywatch did not cover television
programs).
68. See Wagamama [1995] F.S.R. at 737.
69. Because of the result, the discussion may fairly be called dicta. But the
widespread commentary it engendered suggests that it was very important dicta.
70. Judge Laddie stated that although one might normally assume that
Parliament did not add phrases (such as "likelihood of association") without a
specific purpose, that same assumption should not apply to an enactment whose
language is lifted from another source. See Wagamama at 730. Indeed, the court
opined that the expansive interpretation would make the confusing language
superfluous, since it would be subsumed in the dilution oriented interpretation. See
id. at 730-31.
71. In support, plaintiff submitted purported minutes of the European Council.
The court rejected this proffer, casting some doubt on its authenticity, and noting that
such minutes are confidential and cannot be relied on to interpret the Directive. See
id. at 726.
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the authoritative statement of their position. Finally, as a matter of
statutory construction from policy principles, the court reasoned that
the "essential function" of a mark is fulfilled by protecting it from
source confusion. Anything more might inhibit free trade by granting
broader control to the mark owner to enjoin another's trade. This,
the court thought, was antithetical to the free trade principles of the
European Community.' As such, it should not be promoted unless
clearly intended.
The Wagamama opinion was the subject of much commentary, a
good deal of it critical.' However, it proved to be more prescient
than its critics. Under the Treaty of Rome, the European Court of
Justice ("ECJ") guides national courts by interpreting the law of the
European Union, including its Directives. ' And subsequent to the
Wagamama decision, the ECJ spoke to this issue, in Sabel BV v.
Puma AG.75 Sabel was an interpretation of a German statute
implementing the Directive. It is identically worded (at least in its
English version) to section 10(2) of the 1994 Act.76 Several
governments, including the U.K., intervened on one or another side
of the case. The U.K. argued in favor of the Wagamama
interpretation. Others argued for a broad interpretation, similar to
the argument rejected in Wagamama. Ultimately, the ECJ rejected a
broad reading of this provision of the Directive. The ECJ noted that,
in particular, the Benelux" interpretation of the same wording in their
statutes differed significantly from the Wagamama interpretation, by
permitting infringement under the confusion of "association"
language when one mark "calls to mind" another mark.78 The ECJ's
judgment concluded that "association" does not include "calling to
mind," and the Directive requires some likelihood of confusion 9 The
72. See id. at 731.
73. See, e.g., Harris, supra note 62, at 603; Anselm Kamperman Sanders, The
Wagamama Decision:Back to the Dark Ages of Trade Mark Law [1996] 1 E.I.P.R. 3

(opposing the decision); cf. P. Prescott, Think Before You Waga Finger [1996] 6
E.I.P.R. 317 (supporting the decision).
74. Treaty of Rome, supra note 10.
75. See Case C-251/95, 1997 E.C.R. 1-6191, [1998] 1 C.M.LR. 445 (1998).
76. Id. Sabel is actually a case about registration, so the more pertinent section of
the 1994 Act would be section 5. However, sections 5(2) and 10(2) are, in relevant

part, identically worded.
77. See supra note 63.

78. Sabel, 15.
79. Id. 1 56.

On the other hand, the ECJ did indicate that the concept of

confusion itself might be broadly interpreted. It said that the concept "must... be
appreciated globally, taking into account all factors relevant to the circumstances of
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Advocate General's opinion in the case further noted that the
Benelux interpretation appeared to be unique among E.U. members
prior to the Directive,' and concluded (as did the judge in
Wagamama) that the broader interpretation would hamper free
trade-a concept antithetical to the E.U.'s general operation.8'
However, these statements were not included in the ECJ's judgment.
Even the Sabel opinion has not ended the argument over

whether the confusion section allows protection equal to or very close
to dilution. Another case recently decided by the ECJ espoused a
further argument seeking to import the "calling to mind" concept into
the confusion section of the Directive. In MarcaMode CV v. Adidas
AG, Adidas, which has a trademark "consisting of a logo composed
of three stripes,"' challenged, in a Netherlands court, Marca Mode's
right to sell clothing emblazoned with two or three parallel stripes.'
After a lower court issued an injunction, the case reached the
Netherlands Hoge Raad, or Supreme Court, which upheld Adidas'
claim, finding that where a mark "has a particularly distinctive
character" either intrinsically or by acquired reputation, it is sufficient
that there be a "risk of association" when the possibility of confusion

the case." Id. 22. In particular, the more distinctive the mark, or the more similar
the goods, the more likely it is that confusion could result. Id. 24. The requirement
of likelihood of confusion under Article 4(1)(b) of the Directive was affirmed by the
ECJ in Canon Kabushiki Kaisha v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Inc., Case C-39/97 (ECJ
1998). For a discussion of Canon and Sabel, particularly this requirement, see John
A. Tessensohn, May You Live in Interesting Times-European TrademarkLaw in the
Wake of Sabel BV v. Puma AG, 6 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 217 (1999).
80. See Sabel
46 (opinion of Advocate General Jacobs). The Advocate
General renders an advisory opinion prior to the court's decision to aid the judges of
the court. The Advocate General's role has been characterized as "analogous to that
of an individual judge charged with the preparation of the case, whose activity comes
to an end with the delivery of an advisory opinion and who remains separate from the
judges deciding the case." Carl Otto Lenz, The Role and Mechanism of the
Preliminary Ruling Procedure, 18 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 388, 402 (1994) (the author
was, at the time, the ECJ's Advocate General).
81. See Sabel, [46,50-51 (opinion of Advocate General Jacobs). The Advocate
General's opinion in Sabel also indicated that the term "association" is not without
meaning. It ensures that confusion reaches beyond confusion of goods, to "the
mistaken assumption that there is an organisational or economic link between the
undertakings marketing the two products." Id. TT 38, 47. This broader concept of
confusion may call into question the analysis in the Harrodiancase, discussed above,
insofar as it is used in cases of registered marks.
82. Case C-425/98 (opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, Jan. 27,2000).
83. Id. 11.
84. See id. 12.
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cannot be excluded.' The case was referred to the ECJ to determine
whether this was consistent with Article 5(1)(b) of the Directive
(from which section 10(2) of the U.K. Act is derived). Before the
ECJ ruled, its Advocate General's opinion firmly rejected the
Netherlands court's interpretation. The Advocate General regarded
the Sabel and Canon cases as foreclosing such an interpretation of the
Directive.' The opinion stressed that Sabel (and later Canon) had
rejected the notion that "likelihood of association" alone, without
confusion, could support infringement in similar goods cases.'
Moreover, the opinion cited certain policy reasons for rejecting the
Hoge Raad's approach. First, it cited possible interference with the
free trade principle of the E.C. Treaty.' Second, it posited that "the
essential function" of trademark law is to protect the consumer's
ability to distinguish the origin of goods.' The proposed approach, it
said, "would confer more extensive protection on trade-mark owners
than the Court had considered it appropriate to allow pursuant to the
derogation from the principle of the free movement of goods.""n
If the ECJ accepted this broad principle, ' it would have been a
very interesting statement. Trademark dilution is grounded in the
protection of trademark owners, not consumers-and certainly not
protection from deception. If the central principle of trademark law
is consumer protection, that might portend a narrower reading even
of the dilution sections of the Directive.
Moreover, the Advocate General's opinion noted that while
distinctiveness and reputation are relevant factors in determining the
likelihood of confusion, they do not allow one to dispense with an
affirmative showing that confusion is likely, in favor of a presumption
of confusion from "risk of association" with a very distinctive mark.
And the opinion specifically cautioned that a broader reading would
85. Id. [17.

86. See id. 27 (citing Sabel, 1 C.M.L.R. at 451-52 and Canon, 1997 E.C.R. at I6197).
87. The opinion pointedly noted that the Canon case had been decided before
32-33. Apparently, the Advocate
the instant case was referred to the ECJ. Id.
General felt that the Hoge Raad gave insufficient attention to that precedent.
88. See Marca Mode 33.
89. Id. 1 34.
90. Id.
91. See id. As one commentator has pointed out, the ECJ has not always
followed the reasoning of the Advocate General in recent trademark cases, even if it
agrees with the general result. See Tessensohn, supranote 79, at 253.
92. See Marca Mode 1 41-44.
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import dilution into the confusion section, which "would run counter
'
to the scheme of the Directive."93
Finally, Adidas argued that Article 5(2) of the Directive-the
dilution section, applicable only to non-similar goods-should apply
even when the goods are similar.95 The Advocate General rejected
this argument on the grounds that it was not properly presented.' It
is worth noting, however, that the U.K.'s submission apparently
argued against such a use of Article 5(2).'
A few months later, the ECJ also sided with Marca Mode, and
against the Netherlands court." The ECJ first noted that the relevant
portion of the Directive, Article 5(1)(b), was substantially identical to
Article 4(l)(b), which had been interpreted in the Sabel case." Thus,
it viewed Sabel as controlling? The ECJ initially characterized the
decision of the Hoge Raad as allowing a presumption of likelihood of
confusion where a mark is highly distinctive (especially by
"reputation") "and where the sign used by the third party" on the
same or similar goods is so similar to the distinctive mark "as to give
rise to the possibility of its being associated with that mark.' '.. The
ECJ restated Adidas' argument as saying that, regarding "well-known
marks," "the likelihood of association means that a likelihood of
confusion is assumed."' '
However, the distinction between
"possibility" and "likelihood" of association is not clearly made out.
In any event, the ECJ clearly rejected Adidas' argument, and
reiterated that, even with regard to very distinctive marks, "likelihood
of confusion cannot be presumed."'" Although the court agreed that
more distinctive marks may be given greater protection than less
distinctive marks,"°' that is still only one factor in the case-by-case
determination of likelihood of confusion. The ECJ reiterated its test
93. Id. 44.
94. This is the provision on which section 10(3) of the 1994 Act is based.
95. See Marca Mode 45 (citing Directive 89/104/EEC, 1989 O.J. (L 40) 1).
96. See id. 46. The opinion notes that the Netherlands court did not request a
ruling on this issue.
97. See id.
98. See id. T 26.
99. See Directive. Article 4(1)(b) lists grounds for refusing to register a mark.
Article 5(1)(b) lists grounds on which an infringement suit may be founded.
100. See Marca Mode
27,28.
101. Id. 29 (emphasis added).
102. Id. 32 (emphasis added).
103. Id. 33.
104. See id. 41.
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from Sabel that the analysis should take into account all relevant
factors."° It refused to accept the notion that distinctiveness of a mark
could permit a presumption of likelihood of confusion "simply
because of the existence of a likelihood of association in the strict
sense.' ' 06 Thus, the ECJ again firmly rejected an attempt to
circumvent the "likelihood of confusion" requirement in the
Directive and substitute a form of protection that does not require
confusion, at least where the goods in question are "similar."
On the other hand, the MarcaMode judgment does not reject the
concept of dilution outright. In what may be termed dicta, the ECJ
also stated that Article 5(2) of the Directive, dealing with dissimilar
goods (implemented in the U.K. statute as section 10(3)), "establishes
... a form of protection whose implementation does not require the

existence of a likelihood of confusion."' Indeed, despite the ECJ's
apparent resolve to prevent the likelihood of confusion standard from
becoming a dilution standard, it is not disposed to reading dilution
(that is, infringement without confusion) out of the Directive
altogether.
Two things are evident from Marca Mode, Sabel and Canon.
First, litigants and courts in some European countries are continuing
to urge a reading of the Directive that imports dilution into all aspects
of infringement, not just the circumstances described in section 10(3)
of the U.K. Trade Marks Act. Second, the British government has
consistently urged the ECJ to reject these broad interpretations of the
Directive. The Marca Mode case may provide an interesting sequel
to Sabel in determining how far dilution can enter into the general
infringement discussion under the Directive. However, under the
currently used principles of the ECJ's recent opinions, section 10(2)
would not be the source of what we have called dilution protection."3
This still leaves section 10(3), which appears explicitly to allow a
105. See id. 40.
106. Id.

41. Perhaps the added phrase "in the strict sense" was meant to convey

the "possibility" of association. However, that is not clear from the judgment. It
should also be noted that the ECJ's judgment does not contain the broad language
regarding the policy of free competition found in the Advocate General's opinion in
the case.
36. The ECJ stated that, under the facts of Marca Mode, it was
107. Id.
unnecessary to interpret Article 5(2). Id. 24
108. As discussed below in Canon, the ECJ stated that the greater the

distinctiveness of the mark, the broader its protection against confusion. See id. 18.
A lengthy analysis of the arguments discussed by the ECJ in Sabel is found in
Tessensohn, supra note 79, at 251-59, 264-68.
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suit for infringement without any showing of confusion. The passage
of the new trademark statute in 1994 raised expectations that dilution
would become a part of British law.'" Section 10(3) was the key
section supporting these expectations. It provides as follows:
(3) A person infringes a registered trade mark if he uses in the
course of trade a sign which
(a) is identical with or similar to the trade mark, and
(b) is used in relation to goods or services which are not similar to
those for which the trade mark is registered,
where the trade mark has a reputation in the United Kingdom and
the use of the sign, being without due cause, takes unfair advantage
of, or is detrimental to, the distinctive character or the repute of the
trade mark.
The language speaks of activity "detrimental to . . . the distinctive
character" of a mark or of taking "unfair advantage" of the mark. It
does not say anything about confusion. Moreover, the two preceding
sections-10(1) and 10(2)-specifically require confusion for
infringement, within their scope. This strengthens the assumption
that section 10(3) was intended to bring dilution into British law.' 0
However, that proposition has not been as easily accepted as the
statutory language might suggest.
The first major decision under section 10(3) was Baywatch

Production Co. Inc. v. The Home Video Channel."' The Baywatch
case demonstrated the difficulties of imposing a statutory paradigm
change in an area of law that had evolved over a century. The
producers of the television show "Baywatch" (who also owned the
trademark BAYWATCH) sued the producer of a "sexually explicit"
cable television program called "Babewatch.. ' ..2
Although the

109.

See, e.g.,

MARTINO,

supra note 15, at 86, 89-90 & n. 29; RUTH E. AMAND &

HELEN E. NORMAN, BLACKSTONE'S GUIDE TO THE TRADE MARKS AcT OF 1994,

at 15

(Blackstone Press Ltd. 1994) (stating that sections 5(3) and 10(3) of the new Trade
Marks Act incorporate dilution); Sanders, supra note 49, at 69, 70 (1995) (Section
10(3) of the new act "falls within the dilution doctrine.").
110. Section 10(3) is limited in one interesting respect. It applies only to situations
where the second user's goods are not similar to those of the trademark registrant.
Sections 10(1) and 10(2), which require confusion, only apply where the infringing
goods are the same as or similar to the registrant's goods. As will be seen, this
disjunctive way of drafting the statute has proven significant.
111. [1997] F.S.R. 22 (Ch. 1996).
112. See id. at 25-26.
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complaint alleged violations of both sections 10(2) and 10(3), the
court noted that "counsel for the plaintiff ...principally relies on the

claim for trade mark infringement under section 10(3).""'. The court
rejected the claim under section 10(2) for two reasons. First, section
10(2) requires that the goods of the two parties be the same or
"similar," and the court did not believe that such similarity existed
here."' Second, because the issue had been raised, the court
addressed likelihood of confusion and stated that "for the purposes of
this motion [for a preliminary injunction, plaintiff] cannot point to
any actual evidence of confusion.""' 5 Nor, apparently, could plaintiff
show any likelihood of confusion. Thus, the court found no serious
issue to be tried under section 10(2).116

Turning to section 10(3), the court, rather surprisingly, rejected
the plaintiff's assertion that likelihood of confusion is not a
requirement under that section."' The court gave two reasons for
requiring a showing of confusion. First, sections 10(2) and 10(3) are
disjunctive, in the sense that section 10(2) only applies where the
goods are the same or similar, while section 10(3) only applies where
the offending goods "are not similar to those for which the trade
mark is registered."..8 The court believed that giving greater
protection where the goods are not similar than where they are
similar was simply illogical."9 Second, the court cited an earlier
decision by another judge to the effect that there can be no use
"detrimental to... the distinctive character... of the trade mark,"

113. Id. at 27.
114. See id. at 28. This seems somewhat curious, particularly in light of the court's
emphatic separation of the question of similarity of goods from that of confusion. See
id. The court stated that television shows with "adult content" were not similar to
the type of show represented by Baywatch. Id. While the two probably are not
competing shows, it is far from clear that "similarity" was intended to mean
competitive. A more technical explanation is that the mark BAYWATCH was not
registered for television programs, although it was registered for "video tapes and
video discs." Id. at 25. Section 10(2) applies where the second use is "in relation to
goods or services similar to those for which the trade mark is registered." Trade
Marks Act, 1994, § 10(2) (emphasis added). The court did not view video tapes as
similar to television programming. Baywatch [1997] F.S.R. at 28.
115. Id. at 26.
116. See id. at 29-30. The court cited the Wagamama case for the proposition that
"calling to mind" is insufficient to make out a claim under section 10(2). Id. at 28.
The Baywatch opinion came before the ECJ decision in the Sabel case.
117. See id. at 30.
118. Id.; Trade Marks Act, 1994, § 10(3)(b).
119. See Baywatch [1997] F.S.R. at 30.
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nor damage to its reputation, without confusion." Having already
determined that no likelihood of confusion existed, the court refused
to issue an injunction."'
Interestingly, in the Sabel case from the ECJ, the British
government appears to have made an argument that implicitly rejects
the Baywatch decision. In the Advocate General's opinion in Sabel,
an argument similar to that made in Baywatch, regarding the
"similar" vs. "dissimilar" goods dichotomy, was discussed."
However, the Advocate General responded in part as follows:
As the United Kingdom points out, the reason why Article 4(4)(a)
[the EC Directive's dilution provision for registration] applies only
where the goods are dissimilar is no doubt that, where the goods
are similar to goods covered by a mark with a reputation, it is
difficult to imagine a situation in which there will be no likelihood
of confusion.Y3

Moreover, the ECJ's judgment in Sabel states (albeit in dicta) that the
portions of the Directive from which section 10(3) was derived "do
not require proof of likelihood of confusion, even where there is no
similarity between the goods in question."'
As noted above, a
similar statement was made by the ECJ in the Marca Mode case; one
could conclude that the ECJ would not concur in the Baywatch
court's interpretation of section 10(3).'"
In addition to critical commentary," there have also been some
120. Id. at 31 (citing BASF PLC. v. CEP (UK) PLC. (unreported 1995) (Knox,

J.)).

121. See id.
122. Sabel %49 (opinion of Advocate General Jacobs).
123. See id. (emphasis added). Article 4 of the Directive deals with registration;
Article 5 deals with infringement. However, as noted earlier, the pertinent language
in the two Articles is the same.
124. Sabel T 20.
125. Id.; see also supra text accompanying note 107 (citing Marca Mode 36). The
Sabel court's discussion of this matter was referred to as "passing dictum" in Marks &
Spencer PLC v. One in a Million Ltd. [1998] F.S.R. 265, 273 (Ch. 1997); see also
Audi-Med Trade Mark [1998] R.P.D. & T.M. 863, 869-70 (Trade Marks Registry
1998). It may also be relevant that section 10(3), unlike section 10(2) is a nonmandatory provision of the Directive. Whether British courts would adhere to an
ECJ interpretation of such a provision is not clear.
126. One commentator concluded that in light of the Wagamama and Baywatch
decisions (the former decision was agreed with by the ECJ in Sabel), the E.U. should
amend its trademark Directive to clarify and strengthen protection against dilution.
See William T. Vuk, Note, ProtectingBaywatch and Wagamama: Why the European
Union Should Revise the 1989 Trademark Directive to Mandate Dilution Protection
for Trademarks,21 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 861, 927-30 (1998).
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departures from Baywatch's conclusion in other reported applications
of the U.K. statute. One such situation was Audi-Med Trade Mark,"n
an opposition proceeding to a trademark registration. A maker of
hearing aids and associated products sought to register the mark
AUDI-MED. It was opposed by the German car maker Audi. The
main point of contention was the application of section 5(3) of the
Trade Marks Act, which is the counterpart of section 10(3) in the
registration context.'" Though the Examiner noted the precedent of
Baywatch, he also cited the Sabel dictum recited above, and a
discussion contained in Marks and Spencer, PLC v. One in a
Million,29 where the court indicated that Baywatch and Sabel had left
the law under section 10(3) unsettled on the issue of dilution and
confusion. The Examiner then stated his own view, based on his
understanding of the Directive, that section 5(3) allowed opposition
to a registration on the grounds of dilution without regard to
confusion.'30 However, this did not end the analysis. Although Audi
(the car maker) argued that registration of AUDI-MED would cause
dilution, this was rejected. The Examiner carefully considered
whether the AUDI-MED mark would be detrimental to Audi or took
unfair advantage of it. After considering the relatively narrow and
disparate markets each occupied, and the different outlets of sale, the
Examiner concluded that there was little likelihood of AUDI-MED
diluting the distinctiveness of Audi's well-known mark. Further, he
found no basis to believe that AUDI-MED took "unfair advantage"
of the Audi mark. Thus, the opposition was dismissed. 3 ' Although
the Examiner did not require likelihood of confusion, his careful
analysis of the statutory language certainly cabins its application. The
mere fact that one mark may "call to mind" another was not sufficient
to show that it was either detrimental to the other mark or taking
unfair advantage of it.'32 The use of the "limited market" analysis may
127. [1998] R.P.D. & T.M. 863.

128. Section 5(3) is worded the same as section 10(3) in its material part. Section
10 gives the proper standard in a lawsuit for infringement; section 5 governs

registrability. The operative language of section 5 is the same as that of section 10.
129. [1998] F.S.R. 265 (Ch. 1997).
130. See Audi-Med [1998] R.P.D. & T.M. at 871-72. He cited his own prior
opinion in another registration proceeding in which he reached the same conclusion.
See Oasis Stores Ltd.'s Trade Mark Application [1998] R.P.D. & T.M. 631.
131. See Audi-Med [1998] R.P.D. & T.M. at 873-74. Although Audi argued that
the AUDI-MED hearing aids took advantage of the Audi car maker's reputation for

"high technology motor cars," the Examiner disagreed.
132. See id. The same Examiner reached the same conclusion in a more difficult
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provide another basis for limiting dilution protection. Although a
mass marketed item, such as a Rolls Royce candy bar or detergent
could eventually "whittle away" the distinctiveness of the Rolls

Royce mark, where the offending item has a relatively limited
market, the likelihood of a loss of distinctiveness of the famous mark
is small.
C. Statutory Loose Ends: Potential vs. Reality

Obviously, trademark dilution law is at an early stage of
development in the U.K. The few decided cases have left large
unanswered questions in the statutory scheme. Nevertheless, some

useful comparisons with U.S. law can be made. First, as in the early
development of U.S. dilution law, there is an evident reluctance to

abandon the regime of confusion as the centerpiece of trademark
infringement. The Baywatch case in Britain has its counterparts in

U.S. law. 3' In part, this may stem from the shift in the protective
theory away from consumer protection and toward property

protection.
One important question in Britain is what kind of use of a wellknown mark13" will bring it within the ambit of section 10(3). That is,

does the offending use have to be as a trademark-i.e.,in a manner
that distinguishes the goods and services of the user of the mark from
those of others? At least under some state laws in the United States,
the offending use does not have to be as a trademark in order to
violate the dilution statute. 5 Whether "uses in the course of trade"

means a trademark use is required is not clear from the face of the
statute, but it has been held that no such trademark use is required."
case. See Oasis Stores Ltd. [1998] R.P.D. & T.M. 631 (maker of EVEREADY
batteries unsuccessfully opposed registration of EVEREADY for contraceptives).
133. See, e.g., HMH Publ'g Co. v. Lambert, 482 F.2d 595, 599 (9th Cir. 1973); Girl
Scouts of the United States v. Personality Posters Mfg. Co., 304 F. Supp. 1228, 123334 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
134. Section 10(3), taking language from the Directive, applies to marks that
"ha[ve] a reputation in the United Kingdom." I have perhaps taken liberties with
that language by calling such marks "well-known," particularly in light of the ECJ's
rejection of that phrase when discussing what it means to have a reputation. See infra
text at notes 142, 188 (discussing this aspect of the statute).
135. See, e.g., Deere & Co. v. MTD Prod. Inc., 41 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding
that animated version of famous mark used by a competitor in competitive
advertisement to refer to the actual owner of the mark violates dilution statute).
136. See, e.g., Hazel Carty, Do Marks with a Reputation Merit Special Protection?
[1997] 12 E.I.P.R. 684, 685 (stating that "commentators are divided" on this question)
see also Marks & Spencer PLC v. One in a Million Ltd. [1998] F.S.R. 265, 272 (Ch.
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Another open question is what constitutes a use "without just
cause?"'' We have seen in the Audi-Med case that the trademark
Examiner believed that a limited market trademark in a completely
distinct market did not necessarily violate the law. In this way, it may
circumscribe the elusive "blurring" analysis that bedevils U.S. dilution
law."n But what of a parody? Two U.S. examples come to mind here.
The first is Mutual of Omaha v. Novak, 3' where a court enjoined the
sale of various items containing a "Mutant of Omaha" parody of
plaintiff's mark that was a commentary on nuclear power. Although
the decision rested on confusion, not dilution, one might question
whether this sort of use takes unfair advantage of the plaintiff's mark.
A second example is L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc.,
where a federal appeals court overturned an injunction issued under a
dilution theory against a sexually oriented parody of the L.L. Bean
catalog. Here, the court cited free speech principles,' which do not
have the same status in Britain as in the United States.'4" Perhaps
under U.K law pure social commentary using a trademark might not
take unfair advantage of a well-known mark. However, in the U.S.
cases cited above, there was a mixture of social commentary and
commercial venture. This might move the cases into the realm of
what is deemed unfair under British law.'43
Further, the issue of what constitutes "ha[ving] a reputation in
1997) (holding that no trademark use was required). That ruling was upheld on
appeal. British Telecomm. plc v. One in a Million Ltd. [1998] E.R. 476, [1999] R.P.C.
1 (Ct. App. 1998). In British Sugar [1996] R.P.D. & T.M. 291-93, cited in One in a
Million, the court, interpreting section 10(2), also said that a trademark use was not
required.

137. This might be defined in connection with the rest of the section, which
requires that the offending use either take "unfair advantage of" the mark or be
"detrimental to [its] distinctive character or repute."
138. See Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 217 (2d Cir. 1999) ("It is
not yet entirely clear how courts should determine whether a junior use causes a
senior mark to suffer damage.").
139. 775 F.2d 247 (8th Cir. 1985).

140. 811 F.2d 26 (1st Cir.).
141. See id. at 29-33.
142. However, the lack of formal constitutional restraints does not mean that free
speech concepts would be irrelevant in Great Britain. See, e.g., Michael Spence,
Intellectual Property and the Problem of Parody, 114 L.Q. Rav. 594, 608 (1998).
Spence also notes that section 10(3) of the British statute might be construed to apply

to parodies. See id. at 600.
143. See L.L. Bean, Inc., 811 F.2d at 29-33; see also, Ellen Gredley and Maniatis
Spyro, Parody:A FatalAttraction? Part2: Trade Mark Parodies[1997] 8 E.I.P.R. 412,
418 (noting a lack of precedent on this issue).
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the United Kingdom" has yet to be considered. Clearly, marks that
are truly famous throughout the country should be included. But how

much less will be protectable?

This is an important issue. If the

Baywatch decision does not stand up, then marks that are within

section 10(3) will be able to claim broad protection from other
potential users. In a 1999 case decided by the ECJ," the British
government argued that the issue of reputation was intertwined with
the issue of "use without due cause" and "taking unfair advantage of
the distinctive character or the repute" of the mark. ' However, it
further asserted that, unless the mark has a reputation throughout the

country, "proof of actual damage could not be adduced."'" The ECJ
gave a broader reading to the Directive's reach, deciding that the
mark must "be known by a significant part of the public concerned in
a substantial part of [a country]."' 7 But it did not make a particularly
clear distinction between the terms "fame" and "reputation.'
Further litigation in Britain (and, perhaps, the ECJ) will be required
to flesh out the meaning of this term.

Yet another potential issue in dilution law is comparative
advertising. 9 In the United States, the FTDA specifically exempts
144. General Motors Corp. v. Yplon S.A., Case C-375/97, 1999 E.C.R. 1-542.
145. Id. $ 18. The government also asserted that such protection should be
"granted only where clear evidence of actual harm is adduced." Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. 31. It is noteworthy that the ECJ focused on the mark's reputation
among those familiar with the first user's goods. See id.
24, 26. This means that
potential customers of the second user (whose goods, by definition, are not similar to
those of the first user) are not necessarily required to know of the first user's mark.
This broadens the potential reach of Article 5(2) of the Directive, and section 10(3)
of the 1994 Act.
148. See id. 13 (holding that General Motors' claim that "reputation" is not as
stringent as "well known" under Article 6 of the Paris Convention); id. 26 ("The
degree of knowledge required must be considered to be reached when the earlier
mark is known by a significant part of the public concerned . . . ."). However, by
noting General Motors' claim that "reputation" is not the same as "well known"
under the Paris Convention, and then considering that its response (in paragraph 26
of the opinion) did not dispute that assertion, it may be inferred that the ECJ also
rejected a link between the Paris Convention and the Directive. On the other hand,
the ECJ did state (in dictum) that the stronger the mark's reputation, "the easier it
will be to accept that detriment has been caused to it." Id. 30.
149. See generally, Nancy Greiwe, Note, Antidilution Statutes: A New Attack on
Comparative Advertising, 61 B.U. L. Ruv. 220 (1981). At least one U.S. case found
dilution in a humorous parody contained in a comparative advertisement. See Deere
& Co. v. MTD Prod., Inc., 41 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 1994). The EC has issued a Directive
dealing with this subject. See European Union Directive 97/55/EC (amending
Directive 84/450/EEC) [hereinafter Advertising Directive). A complete analysis is
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truthful comparative advertising from the dilution law.'50 In Britain,
section 10(6) of the 1994 Act-which was not derived from the
Directive-specifically addresses comparative advertising. It reads:
(6) Nothing in the preceding provisions of this section shall be
construed as preventing the use of a registered trade mark by any
person for the purpose of identifying goods or services as those of
the proprietor or a licensee.

But any such use otherwise than in accordance with honest
practices in industrial or commercial matters shall be treated as

infringing the registered trade mark if the use without due cause
takes unfair advantage of, or is detrimental to, the distinctive
character or repute of the trade mark.'51
The first sentence appears to provide a general exception for
comparative advertising, even of the sort seen in the Deere case. (In
Deere, the competitor used Deere's mark to refer to Deere, not to the
competitor.) However, the second sentence arguably removes much
of the protection of the first sentence. Essentially, it apparently
eliminates the right to use a mark in comparative advertising if (1) it
is a use contrary to "honest practices in industrial or commercial
matters," and (2) the use takes "unfair advantage of' or is
"detrimental to the distinctive character or repute of the trade mark."
This last part of the second sentence is identical in language to section
10(3). But the first part of the sentence is an additional requirement.
Thus, a "dishonest" use that is also diluting within the meaning of
section 10(3) would subject the user to an infringement suit. 52 This
makes "honest practices" the gatekeeper between diluting uses that
are and are not infringing. Apparently the drafters believed that not
all potentially diluting uses in comparative advertising were
"dishonest" and subject to an infringement suit. But that phrase is
obviously beyond the scope of this Article. For further analysis, see Roslyn S.
Harrison, The Proposed European Directive on
TRADEMARK WORLD,

Comparative Advertising,

Sept. 1997 at 18; Sonya M. Willimsky, Comparative

Advertising: An Overview [1996] 18 E.I.P.R. 649.
150. See Lanham Act, § 43(c)(4)(A); 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(4)(A).
151. Directive, supra note 6, art. 10(4). The Trade Marks Act is not the only
source of regulation of comparative advertising in Britain. See, e.g., Willimsky, supra
note 149, at 650-51 (citing the Control of Misleading Advertisements Regulations
1988, the Broadcasting Act 1990, the Trade Descriptions Act 1968, the Consumer
Protection Act 1987, as well as common law tort actions).
152. See Barclays Bank v. RBS Advanta, R.P.D. & T.M. 307 (1996) (denying a
preliminary injunction against an ad comparing the terms of several credit card
issuers).
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fraught with subjectivity. Take the Deere case as an example. If one
accepts the post-hoc logic of the Second Circuit that Deere was in
reality a case of trademark "tarnishment, ' '53 then the competitor's use
could be deemed a use "detrimental to" the distinctive character of
the mark. We then must determine whether such a use would violate
"honest practices." Perhaps all that is protected by the notion of
"honest practices" is a bland, straightforward use of the mark by a
competitor, not the humorous, animated (but not especially nasty)
alteration of the mark used in Deere. On the other hand, there was
no indication in Deere of any misrepresentation, nor any association
of the mark with particularly unsavory messages."' The scope of this
exception remains to be seen. 5 ' If Baywatch is followed, it may
require a showing of likelihood of confusion, or at least some kind of
deception, to make a comparative advertising use of a mark into an
infringing use.
153. See Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prod., Inc., 73 F.3d 497, 507 (2d Cir.
1996).
154. The animated mark in Deere was depicted as scampering away in the face of
competition. See Deere, 41 F.3d at 41.
155. Two cases decided under the Trade Marks Act indicate that British courts
may have little inclination to use section 10(6) to restrict comparative advertising.
See Vodafone Group, PLC v. Orange Personal Communications Serv., Ltd., F.S.R. 34
(1996) (dismissing a challenge to a cellular telephone ad that said its customers "on
average.., save £20 a month"); Barclays Bank, R.P.D. & T.M. at 307 (denying a
preliminary injunction against an ad comparing the terms of several credit card
issuers). The difficulty of interpreting section 10(6) was noted in Tamara Quinn,
Comparative Advertising, Barclays Bank v. RBS Advanta [1996] 6 E.I.P.R. 368. It
may become a moot point with the EC Directive on comparative advertising. See
Advertising Directive, supra note 149. Article 3(a) of this Directive contains two
sections relevant to the dilution discussion. Section 1(e) of Article 3(a) requires that
comparative advertising "not discredit or denigrate the trade marks, trade names,
other distinguishing marks, goods, services, activities, or circumstances of a
competitor. " Section 1(g) requires that comparative advertising "not take unfair
advantage of the reputation of a trade mark, trade name or other distinguishing
marks of a competitor or of the designation of origin of competing products." (A
separate subsection, 1(d), prohibits confusing uses of trademarks in comparative
advertising.) Section 1(e) seems aimed at tarnishment, and might impose liability
under the circumstances of the Deere case cited above. Section 1(g) has an even
broader potential, since it tracks the dilution language of the Trademarks Directive.
Thus, it would not necessarily be a defense to a dilution action that the use was in
comparative advertising. Obviously, not all comparative uses could be considered
taking "unfair advantage," else the Advertising Directive would have little value.
But it does suggest that this Directive and the Trademark Directive might be
interpreted in the same manner. The Advertising Directive was to be implemented
by member states within two and a half years of its official publication (which
occurred October 23, 1997). Of course, in the past, member states have not heeded
Directive implementation deadlines, so the real effective date is uncertain.
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An issue related to comparative advertising is "collateral use."
In the United States, "collateral use" refers to the use of a mark in
situations such as used products, genuine but possibly unauthorized
sales of goods (e.g., gray market goods or parallel imports), and the
like. Case law in the United States recognizes the legitimacy of such
collateral uses, as long as there is no deception or likelihood of
5 6 Although not directly implicating dilution, arguments
confusion."
that collateral uses should be prohibited are related to dilution
arguments. In essence, they make the case that the collateral uses are
"free riding" on the mark's reputation, since the collateral user does
not make the trademarked product. To the extent that such uses are
restricted with little real evidence of confusion, they give wide
ranging control-approaching that of dilution-to the trademark
owner.
Recently, the ECJ considered this kind of issue in a suit between
auto manufacturer BMW and the owner of a used car and repair shop
The Council
that used the BMW mark to advertise its services."
Directive on trademarks contains specific provisions giving protection
to people who are advertising repair parts or used goods. In the
BMW case, the ECJ decided that the mere use of the mark to
promote the sale of genuine (even if used) goods could not be
prohibited." However, the court noted that use of the mark could be
prohibited if the advertisement were to suggest "that the reseller's
business is affiliated to the trade mark proprietor's distribution
15 9
network or that there is a special relationship between the two.'
The court then considered defendant's advertised claims that he
"specialized" in the repair of BMW cars. It accepted the U.K.'s
argument that Article 6 of the Directive (permitting someone to use a
156. See, e.g., Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Sanders, 331 U.S. 125 (1947)

(reconditioned spark plugs may keep "Champion" name as long as they are labeled
as renewed); Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 562, 563, 569 (9th Cir. 1968)
(comparative advertising permitted if accurate). Much of the argument in the cases is
over whether the goods on which the mark appears are "genuine." See, e.g., Monte
Carlo Shirt, Inc. v. Daewoo Int'l (America) Corp., 707 F.2d 1054, 1058 (9th Cir.
1983); Matrix Essentials, Inc. v. Cosmetic Gallery, Inc., 870 F. Supp. 1237, 1251
(D.N.J. 1994), affd, 85 F.3d 612 (3d Cir. 1996); see also Lever Bros. Co. v. United
States, 877 F.2d 101, 108-09 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
157. See Bayerische Motorenwerke AG v. Deenik, Case C-63/97, 1999 E.C.R. I905. The same court previously ruled, in Parfums ChristianDior v. Evora, Case C337/95, 1997, that a reseller may use the manufacturer's mark to promote the sale of
the manufacturer's goods.
158. See Deenik, 1999 E.C.R. 1-905 53.
159. Id. [ 51,52.
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mark to "indicate the intended purpose of a product or service")
permitted a repair shop to use the BMW mark to indicate that the
purpose of the repair service was to repair BMWs.'"
The precise contours of collateral use in the U.K. and other parts
of Europe are beyond the scope of the present discussion. But the
ECJ's decision indicates that Europe is at least moving in the general
direction of U.S. law in this area, and not toward acute protection of
mark owners at the expense of competition.
D. Dilution in Another Form
1. The Issue of "Similar" Goods
Even if dilution protection is interpreted restrictively, mark
owners may find that traditional confusion doctrine can be very
protective of their rights. In part, the breadth of this protection
depends on how one interprets section 10(2). As discussed earlier,
section 10(2) provides the traditional trademark infringement
protection against confusion, but only if the offending mark or "sign"
is used on the "identical" or "similar" goods or services as those for
which the mark is registered; dissimilar goods are treated under
section 10(3). Thus, to some extent, the protection offered by section
10(2) depends on how one defines "similar." The more "dissimilar"
the goods can be and still be within section 10(2), the more marks will
be protected by that section. This may seem both anomalous and
thankless, since on the surface section 10(3) provides better
protection than section 10(2). However, the uncertainty and
unfamiliarity of section 10(3) may make some judges uncertain about
its reach. Its requirement that the mark have a "reputation" in the
U.K. also will limit the number of marks subject to its protection.
And its requirement of detriment to goodwill may restrict its use even
further. Section 10(2), grounded in traditional trademark theory, may
appear a safer and simpler choice (and is the only choice for marks
lacking a "reputation"). If a litigant can persuade a court to stretch
the meaning of "confusion," then it becomes a very desirable choice,
indeed.
In British Sugar PLC v. James Robertson & Sons, Ltd.,'6 the
court considered this question of similarity. The products involved

160. Id. T1 59, 60.
161. R.P.D. & T.M. 281 (1996).
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were an ice cream dessert topping called TREAT'62 and a toffee
flavored spread, primarily to be used instead of jam or jelly.'63 The
court treated the issue of similarity as mark-independent. That is,
whether the goods are similar was not a function of the nature of the
mark, or its renown.'6 Ultimately, the court decided that the goods
were not similar, despite the fact that the defendant's product easily
could be used as a dessert topping."
However, this analysis-in effect separating similarity from
likelihood of confusion-may need to be reconsidered in light of the
ECJ's decision in Canon Kabushiki Kaisha v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer,
Inc." Canon involved an opposition by Canon (a Japanese company)
to the registration of the mark "Canon" in Germany by the American
company Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer ("MGM").
The basis of the
opposition was likelihood of confusion, not dilution.67 Thus, one
issue was whether the two companies used the mark on the same or
"similar" goods. In the ECJ, the U.K. took the position that the issue
of similarity should be completely separate from the issue of the
reputation of the mark or its "distinctive character."" However, the
ECJ noted that, in assessing likelihood of confusion, courts are
admonished to weigh a variety of interdependent factors,'69 and that a
more distinctive mark will receive broader protection.'7 Thus, the
ECJ concluded that the greater the mark's distinctiveness, the less
similarity need be shown to bring it within the confusion section.'7 '
Of course, this is not to the mark owner's advantage, unless
confusion is broadly defined. As to that issue, the ECJ stated its
162. See id. As the court pointed out, although TREAT was registered as a

trademark, the company (the plaintiff in the action) used its Silver Spoon mark
together with TREAT and the TREAT mark was not particularly strong.
163. See id. The defendant's product was called "Robertson's Toffee Treat." It
appeared that Toffee Treat was not used as a trademark for the product-the

identifying mark was "Robertson's."
164. The court set forth a multifactor test for similarity.
165. See id. The court expressed concern about granting a monopoly to a

"comparatively short user of a highly laudatory word." Id.

166. Case C-39/97, 1998 E.C.R. 1-5507.
167. The Directive, like the U.K. statute, invokes dilution for the protection of
dissimilar goods, and uses confusion as the basis for infringement between the same

or similar goods. See id. 8 (quoting Directive, Art. 4(1)(b)).
168. CanonKabushiki, Case C-39/97

14.

169. See id. 17.
170. See id. 18.
171. See id. IT 19, 24. The ECJ did state, however, that some level of similarity of
goods always must be shown, regardless of the level of distinctiveness. Id.

22.
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holding this way:
There may be likelihood of confusion within the meaning of Article
4(1)(b) of the Directive even where the public perception is that
the goods or services have different places of production. By
contrast, there can be no such likelihood where it does not appear
that the public could believe that the goods or services come from
the same undertaking or, as the case may be, from economicallylinked undertakings.'7
Canon thus produces two interesting results. First, marks that
are very distinctive may be protected against confusion even from

uses on fairly dissimilar goods."3
Second, the definition of
"confusion" includes a fairly broad range of conduct. By including
confusion that the two undertakings are "economically linked," the
ECJ seems to permit a form of confusion of sponsorship which was
rejected in the Harrodiancase. Thus, the indications in British Sugar
that similarity of goods and the nature of confusion are narrowly
construed may prove inaccurate.'74
If so, this has important
implications for well-known marks. The dilution rationale-without
confusion-still may seem like the easier path to proving
infringement. But unless a non-confusing use takes unfair advantage
of or is detrimental to the goodwill of the well-known mark, section
10(3) will not apply. On the other hand, there could be confusion
without unfair advantage, especially where well-known marks are
concerned. In that case, a broad confusion rationale helps the owner
of the well-known mark. However, it should be remembered that, as
172. Id. $ 30.
173. After Sabel, but before Canon, the British Trade Marks Office made an
interesting application of British Sugar in Balmoral Trade Mark [1999] R.P.C. 297
(Appointed Person 1998). The office refused to register BALMORAL for wines, on
the grounds of likely confusion with the BALMORAL mark for whiskey and bar
services (the latter mark is owned by the proprietor of the well-known Balmoral
hotel in Edinburgh). The result is certainly consistent with Canon. What is
interesting about Balmoral is its characterization of the test of British Sugar.
"Distinctiveness, resemblance and proximity of trading are matters of fact and degree
which should be given the weight and priority they deserve as part of the overall
assessment." Though not entirely inconsistent with British Sugar's separation of
distinctiveness from similarity, this statement does seem to look somewhat like
Canon's analysis, where distinctiveness and similarity are intertwined.
174. Of course, the ECJ's rather general statements must be applied in specific
situations by individual national courts. The results of fact specific inquiries may
reflect the underlying philosophies of each nation toward trademark protection. For
example, the TREAT mark at issue in British Sugar was deemed comparatively
weak. Thus, the result-narrowly viewing the scope of goods within its protective
ambit-may not be inconsistent with Canon.
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Sabel and Marca Mode stated, some showing of likelihood of
confusion is still required in similar goods cases.
2. And Don't ForgetPassingOff
In an earlier section of this discussion, cases involving common
law passing off were discussed. Although the results were somewhat
contradictory, the possibility that this action could be used to create
trademark protection without requiring confusion should not be
overlooked. The Taittinger rationale certainly would provide such
protection. There is another passing off case that is doctrinally
somewhere between the Taittinger and Harrodian cases (though
preceding both in time). In Lego System Aktieselskab v. Lego M.
Lemelstrich,'75 plaintiff, maker of Lego building block toys for
children, sued an Israeli company which made and sold irrigation
equipment using the name LEGO, alleging passing off. Although the
two companies served very disparate markets,'76 the court found in
favor of plaintiff. True to the traditional analysis of passing off, the
court looked to whether a substantial number of people were likely to
be confused about a connection between plaintiff and defendant.
However, the nature of the facts, and the language of the opinion,
lean more toward the Taittingeropinion than Harrodian.
In the first place, the products at issue-children's building
blocks and irrigation systems-are very different and target
completely different customers." There was no evidence that the
irrigation company had any intent to cause confusion or to use the
LEGO mark to attract interest in its product.
Second, the court emphasized aspects of a passing off claim that
have more in common with a dilution claim (particularly one under
section 10(3)) than a confusion claim. For example, the court placed
great emphasis on the following excerpt from Lord Diplock's opinion
in the Advocaat case (the leading modem passing off opinion):
Spalding v. Gamage led the way to recognition by judges of other

species of the same genus, as where although the plaintiff and the
defendant were not competing traders in the same line of business,
a false suggestion by the defendant that their businesses were
175. [1983] F.S.R. 155 (Ch. 1982).
176. There also was no evidence of any bad faith on the part of the Israeli

company.
177. In that regard, the case is even more protective of trademarks than Taittinger,
which involved two different types of sparkling beverages, one alcoholic and one
non-alcoholic.
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connected with one another would damage the reputation and thus
the goodwill of the plaintiff's business.Y

And again, quoting Advocaat, the court emphasized the concept of
loss of "goodwill" in passing off cases:
This was left to be provided by Lord Parker in Spalding v. Gamage
(1915) 32 R.P.C. 273. In a speech which received the approval of
the other members of this House, he identified the right the
invasion of which is the subject of passing off actions as being the
"property in the business or goodwill likely to be injured by the
misrepresentation." The concept of goodwill is in law a broad one
which is perhaps expressed in words used by Lord MacNaghten in
C.I.R. v. Muller [1901] A.C. 217, 223: "It is the benefit and
advantage of the good name, reputation and connection
of a
179
'
business. It is the attractive force which brings in custom.'

Recall that section 10(3) of the U.K. Trade Marks Act-the dilution
section-also emphasizes damage to the trademark owner's goodwill
through the actions of an unauthorized user.
Third, the court cited several passing off cases that resemble
dilution cases, including the early Kodak case, Eastman Photographic
Materials Co. v. Griffiths Cycle Corp. Ltd.,'"' which often has been
touted as an early dilution case.'
This further supports a view of
passing off that de-emphasizes confusion, or at least virtually
presumes it, when the mark is very well known.'" Moreover, the type
of confusion in Lego looks more like confusion of sponsorship or
approval than confusion of source."8
178. Lego System Aktieselskab v. Lego M. Lemelstrich Ltd. [1983] 9 F.S.R. 155,
184 (Ch. 1982) (referred to as "the Advocaat case") (calling it "an important
passage").
179. Id. at 183 (quoting Erven Warnink BV v. Townend & Son (Hull) Ltd. [1980]
R.P.C. 31 (H.L.)).
180. See id. [1983] F.S.R. at 185 (citing Eastman, 15 R.P.C. 105).
181. The Lego court further stated that "in Lord Diplock's formulation [of the
passing off standards] there is no limitation as to the relation of the field of activity of
the defendant to that of the plaintiff." Id. at 187. Thus, the court rejected any need
for the products at issue to have any logical relationship at all.
182. There were some countervailing features in the case that should be noted.
Although the two products were very disparate in their markets, both were made of
colored plastic. This seems to have influenced some of plaintiff's witnesses to assume
a connection between the toy maker and the irrigation equipment maker. See, e.g.,
id. at 166 (testimony of Mr. Lee), 169 (testimony of Mr. Saunders). And the court
spent considerable time discussing plaintiffs survey evidence, which demonstrated
likely confusion. Id. at 173-82.
183. Recall that in Harrodian, the court emphasized the need for confusion of
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Obviously, the subsequent decision in the Harrodiancase makes
it very difficult to state that the direction of passing off is toward
broader protection with less emphasis on confusion. Indeed, the
Harrodian decision and the Baywatch decision share an evident
caution about expanding the traditional bases of protection for
trademark owners. It seems that the British courts are still uncertain
about how far to go in the direction of protection of goodwill without
attendant confusion. However, the inclination of British courts, as
evidenced by decisions such as that in Baywatch, counsels caution.
The courts may see an attempt to use passing off for dilution as a
means of circumventing the statutory balance between protection of
trademark owners and the needs of competition."M
E. Summary: The Unknown Future-How Broad is My Mark?
The newness of the statute and the absence of significant
precedent makes conclusions about British dilution law problematic.
But some themes are emerging.
First, British courts (as evidenced by the Baywatch decision and
indicated by Audi-Med and Oasis) are moving very cautiously in this
area. Dilution does not fit the common British trademark paradigm,
and there does not seem to be a rush to grant broad protection.
Baywatch clearly rejects the paradigm by requiring confusion. The
Audi-Med and Oasis registration decisions, while not going that far,
still permitted registrations by someone other than the owner of the
well-known mark, and rejected highly protective interpretations of
the dilution sections of the 1994 Act.
Second, the British Government's submissions to the ECJ
indicate a "go slow" attitude as well. It (successfully) argued against
a broad reading of the "likelihood of association" language contained
in section 10(2) of the 1994 Act, and argued for a relatively restrictive
reading of the "reputation" language in the dilution section. If the
British courts take their cue from the Government's assessment of
Parliament's work, one would not expect a rush for broad protection
under section 10(3) or section 10(2)."

source, and believed such confusion unlikely in that case.
184. See also Ian Karet, Passing Off and Trade Marks: Confusing Times Ahead?

[1995] 1 E.I.P.R. 3 (discussing possible use of "post-sale" confusion in passing off
cases, but noting lack of case law on the issue).
185. Obviously, a definitive statement from the ECJ on the subject could alter this
attitude significantly.
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IlL. Dilution in Canada: Broad Scope, Narrow Application?
A. The Statutory Basis for Dilution Protection
Statutorily, at least, Canada has a far longer history of dilution
protection than Great Britain. Its 1953 Trade Marks Act (which still
applies) contains a specific section protecting marks against
depreciation of their goodwill, which a U.S. practitioner would
recognize as dilution. Section 22 of the Trade Marks Act provides as
follows:
Depreciation of goodwill
22. (1) No person shall use a trade-mark registered by another
person in a manner that is likely to have the effect of depreciating
the value of the goodwill attaching thereto.
Action in respect thereof
(2) In any action in respect of a use of a trade-mark contrary to
subsection (1), the court may decline to order the recovery of
damages or profits and may permit the defendant to continue to
sell wares marked with the trade-mark that were in his possession
or under his control at the time notice was given to him that the
owner of the registered trade-mark complained of the use of the
trade-mark.'6
This section of the statute does not require any showing of
likelihood of confusion. It appears in many ways to be like the
protection discussed above in the British Taittinger case. Despite its
relative age, the statute has received nothing approaching the judicial
attention that federal and state dilution laws have in the United
States."

1. The Broad Scope and Narrow "Use" of Section 22
On its face, section 22 appears to protect marks even more
broadly than section 10(3) of the 1994 Act in the U.K. The U.K.
statute requires that the affected mark have "a reputation in the
United Kingdom;" no such requirement exists under section 22.
Section 10(3) requires use "without due cause;" again, no such
186. R.S.C. 1985, c. T-13, § 22.
187. Perhaps this reflects a less litigious society. However, it may also reflect some
of the difficulties litigants have faced when they attempt to obtain preliminary
injunctive relief under this section.
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requirement is evident in section 22." However, for a number of
years after its enactment, section 22 received little treatment in
Canada's courts.
The first lengthy judicial consideration of this section appears to
be in Clairol International Corp. v. Thomas Supply & Equip. Co.,
Ltd."
The essence of the complaint involved comparative
advertising. Revlon, the defendant, had produced a chart containing
side by side comparisons of various shades of its Revlon Colorsilk
hair coloring with those of plaintiff Clairol's Miss Clairol Hair Color
Bath and Nice 'N Easy hair colorings." The purpose of the chart was
to show consumers which shades of Revlon's products corresponded
to various shades of Clairol's products. The chart was featured in
Revlon advertising brochures and on packages of Revlon's hair color
products. Clairol sued Revlon, asserting various legal theories,
including false advertising, trademark dilution under section 22,
trademark infringement, and unfair competition.' The count alleging
false or misleading statements in the chart (i.e., false advertising) was
rejected as unproven." Clairol then argued that section 7(e) of the
Trade Marks Act, which prohibits "any... business practice contrary
to honest industrial or commercial usage in Canada," applied without
regard to the falsity of the statements. However, the court rejected
that argument.'
188. Whether taking "unfair advantage of, or [being] detrimental to, the
distinctive character... of the trade mark" differs significantly from "depreciating
the value of the goodwill" of the mark is difficult to say.
189. 38 Fox's Patent Cas. 176 (Exch. Ct. 1968). Some earlier cases and
administrative decisions refer briefly to this section. See, e.g., Blue Chip Premium

Co., Ltd. v. Alberta Distillers, Ltd., 20 Fox's Patent Cas. 55, 56 (Reg. Trade Marks
1960) (rejecting an opposition to registration based, inter alia, on section 22 of the
Trade Marks Act); G.D. Searle & Co. v. Gilbert Surgical Supply Co., 19 Fox's Patent
Cas. 172, 175 (Exch. Ct. 1960) (deferring consideration of the issue); cf Insulfoam

Ltd. v. Robinson Foams, Ltd., 19 Fox's Patent Cas. 47 (Reg. Trade Marks 1959)
(finding no confusion between the mark INSULFOAM for plastic foam lining and
clothing and the same mark for industrial insulation products; section 22 was not
mentioned in the decision).
190. See id. at 182-83.
191. See id. at 183-84. I have taken the liberty of "translating," perhaps loosely,
some of the plaintiff's legal claims from Canadian legal terminology to their U.S.
equivalents. Technically, the claims were under sections 7(d), 7(e), 19 and 22 of the
Trade Marks Act.
192. See id. at 187 (discussing section 7(d), an unfair competition count). The
possible use of section 7 as a form of dilution protection is discussed below in Part

III.B.2.
193. See id. at 187-88. The court also rejected a non-confusion based infringement
claim under section 19, which gives a registered mark owner the "exclusive right" to
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Turning to the dilution claim under section 22, the judge
recognized this as a case of first impression."9 He also recognized that
the linchpin of the section is not confusion or deception, but
"depreciat[ion] of the value of the goodwill attaching to the trade
mark."'95 The judge first considered what sort of "use" of a mark
would be encompassed by section 22, and found that "use" on the
product packages themselves was within section 22, while "use" in the

brochures was not.19
As to the chart on the packages, the judge considered what
constituted a depreciation of goodwill. Essentially, he found that

although the goodwill of the mark includes elements of honesty and
reputation, at its core is the ability of the mark to attract customers.

Defendant's use of plaintiff's mark in a manner directed at plaintiff's
customers, and designed to wean them from the habit of buying
plaintiff's product, was, in the judge's view, a depreciation of
plaintiffs goodwill.'" As such, he enjoined the use of the chart on
defendant's packages.

No doubt, a U.S. practitioner would be

surprised by such a result. Truthful comparative advertising has long
been considered non-infringing by our courts.'" Moreover, the
FTDA specifically exempts truthful comparative advertising from the
scope of its protection.'" The potential breadth of this section thus

exceeds that of U.S. laws on dilution) °°
use the mark in Canada. The court held that section 19 did not apply where the
"use" of the mark was not intended to distinguish the defendant's goods from those
of another-i.e., where the offending use was not as a trademark. Id. at 192-94.
194. See id. at 194 (noting that no other decided cases had applied this section).
195. Id. at 195.
196. See id. at 196. The judge referred to his earlier discussion in the case where
he interpreted "use" within the definition provided by section 4 of the Trade Marks
Act. He read that section clearly to include use of the offending mark on the goods
themselves, even if it was not a trademark use. However, in his view "use" did not
encompass the brochures, which did not give purchasers "notice" that the plaintiff's
mark was associated with defendant's goods. Id. at 190-91.
197. See id. at 200-01.
198. See, e.g., G.D. Searle & Co. v. Hudson Pharm. Corp., 715 F.2d 837, 841 (3d
Cir. 1983); Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 562, 563-64 (9th Cir. 1968).
199. See Lanham Act § 43(c)(4)(A) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(4)(A)).
200. The Clairol court did limit the scope of "use" just a bit. It opined, in dicta,
that a storekeeper's use of another's marks in a competitive price chart, or a critical
remark in an ordinary conversation, would not be encompassed by the statute. See
Clairol,38 Fox's Patent Cas. at 195. It is worth reiterating that section 22 appears to
protect any mark, regardless of its renown, unlike the FTDA in the United States,
which applies only to "famous" marks (and section 10(3) in the U.K., applying to
marks with a "reputation").
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The sweep of section 22 was further illustrated in Source Perrier
(Socidtg Anonyme) v. Fira-LessMarketing Co., Ltd." Defendant sold

ordinary water in bottles resembling plaintiff's well-known Perrier
bottles. However, the label read "Pierre Eh!" intending to be a
parody of then Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau. The court found both
confusion and dilution under separate sections of the Trade Marks
Act.' Discussing dilution under section 22, the court not only cited
the Clairol case, but also several well-known U.S. cases in support of
its conclusion that the parody depreciated Perrier's goodwill.'
Although problematic cases in the United States certainly exist where
such parodies were enjoined under U.S. law, ' the particular U.S.
cases cited by the court were ones where the sexual innuendo or drug

connections of the offending products made them particularly
susceptible to attack as tarnishing the good name of the mark owner.
By contrast, the parody of Perrier was rather tame.' In fact, were it
not for the court's conclusion that the defendant's product was likely
to cause confusion, this would seem to be a very weak case under
section 22. The statute, after all, refers to "depreciation of goodwill."
201. 70 C.P.R.2d 61,1983 (Fed. Ct. 1983).
202. Id.
203. See Girl Scouts, USA v. Personality Posters Mfg. Co., 304 F. Supp. 1228
(S.D.N.Y. 1969) (poster of a pregnant Girl Scout with the motto "Be Prepared";
preliminary injunction denied); Dallas Cowboy Cheerleaders604 F.2d 200; Coca-Cola
Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1183 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (poster with Coca-Cola
red and white "wave" and words "Enjoy Cocaine" written in script typically used by
Coca-Cola).
204. See, e.g., Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397 (8th Cir. 1987)
(enjoining sale of t-shirts, caps, and mugs with a "Mutant of Omaha" logo used as a
protest against nuclear power on a confusion theory); see also Deere & Co. v. MTD
Products, Inc., 41 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 1994) (enjoining, under New York antidilution
statute, use of a humorous animated alteration of plaintiff's logo in a comparative
advertisement).
205. The court rejected an argument that the freedom of expression guaranteed by
the Canadian Constitution protected the parody. See Source Perrier (Source
Anonyme) v. Fira-Less Mktg. Co. [1983] 70 C.P.R.2d 61 (Fed. Ct.); see also Cie
Generale des Etablissements Michelin-Michelin & Cie v. C.A.W.-Canada, 71
C.P.R.3d 348, 1996 CPR Lexis 481 at 462-74 (Fed. Ct. 1996) (rejecting a parody
defense and a free expression defense to copyright infringement, after rejecting a
section 22 claim); see generally David Fewer, ConstitutionalizingCopyright: Freedom
of Expressionand the Limits of Copyrightin Canada,55 U. TOR. FAc. L. REv. (1997)
(noting that Canadian copyright law has not given great credence to free expression
arguments). Similar arguments under the First Amendment in this country have met
with mixed results. Compare Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 402
(8th Cir. 1987) (rejecting First Amendment defense to trademark infringement claim)
with L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishing, 811 F.2d 26 (1st Cir.) (rejecting dilution
claim on free speech grounds).
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Clearly, tarnishment would fall under that rubric. However, a nontarnishing parody ought not to depreciate the goodwill of the better
known mark.' Thus, without tarnishment, a parody should not cause
"blurring" of the mark's significance. In that case, no depreciation of
goodwill takes place-the parody certainly was not intended to take
customers of Perrier away, but rather to have its customers buy the
parody product in addition to the Perrier product. The influence of
misappropriation theory-defendant made money by attaching its
parody to the well-known Perrier mark-cannot be discounted as a
factor in this decision. Nevertheless, the willingness of the Canadian
courts to permit an action under section 22 in such situations is
further evidence of the difference between the scope of that section
and U.S. notions of trademark dilution.
An interesting, and almost prototypical, use of section 22 was
made in Ontario Inc. v. Sony Kabushiki Kaisha.' Plaintiff sold
compact discs ("CDs") and related items by mail, using the trademark
CD PLUS (which it registered). Sony sought to register the mark CD
PLUS for CDs, CD players, CD ROM software, and related items.'
The major problem for plaintiff, as found by the court, was described
in terms of dilution by a kind of "reverse confusion":'
Sony's use of the name CD PLUS in Canada will cause the plaintiff
to lose control of its trade mark as the Canadian market will be
flooded with advertising, promotion and products all using the
name CD PLUS. The trade mark would be in the hands of a much
larger and more powerful group, who would be directing all of its
efforts at the same customer base in Canada shared by Sony and
the plaintiff, namely purchasers of compact discs. The plaintiff is
intending to expand its operations by franchising more retail outlets
under the name CD PLUS. In order to achieve this, it is necessary
that the plaintiff have a distinctive trade mark. The entitlement to
use the CD PLUS name is one of the largest benefits to being a
franchisee; this benefit is lost if the plaintiff no longer has a
206. Indeed, as I have argued elsewhere, a successful parody depends on the
continued association by the public of the mark with the better known owner. See
Welkowitz, supra note 15, at 552-53.
207. [1995] 65 C.P.R.3d 171 (Fed. Ct. T.D.).
208. This was part of a Sony initiative to develop so called "enhanced CDs." One
twist in this case is that the larger company, Sony, was the defendant, not the
plaintiff.
209. "Reverse confusion" occurs when the subsequent user-usually a larger
company-causes consumers to believe that it is the first user who is the interloper,
not the second user. See Big 0 Tire Dealers, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,
561 F.2d 1365, 1371-72 (10th Cir. 1977).
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distinctive trade mark to offer to potential franchisees. If Sony uses
the CD PLUS name in Canada, the plaintiff's effective use of the
trade mark on its catalogue, magalogue and retail stores will be lost
in all of the attention paid to Sony and its new technology."'
Although the court also found evidence of confusion, 1 it specifically
found a violation of section 22 on the following basis:
Confusion is not needed to prove depreciation of a trade mark.

Obliteration of the distinctiveness of a trade mark necessarily
depreciates whatever goodwill is attached to the mark. The
purpose of the trade mark is to preserve the goodwill of the
plaintiff's service. There is a serious issue to be tried [under section
22] !2

And, in granting a preliminary injunction, the court made two
findings that were based on dilution:
(b) Sony's use of the CD PLUS name will render the plaintiffs
trade mark generic and, therefore, non-distinctive of the plaintiff's
business;
(d) Sony's infringement will annihilate the plaintiff's proprietary
rights in its trade mark and its associated goodwill.2 3
Thus, the court used section 22 both to protect against the mark being
"overwhelmed" (and thus less distinctive in the marketplace) and
against "genericide" of the mark. Unlike section 10(3) of the 1994
Act in the U.K., there was no requirement of a reputation in
plaintiff's mark (indeed, its lack of a 21
reputation appears to have been
1
overwhelmed)
be
could
it
one reason
However, the broad potential of section 22 is not always reached
in practice. First of all, the "use" limitation of Clairol can be a serious
obstacle to relief. This was demonstrated in Syntex Inc. v. Apotex
1 ' Plaintiff and defendant were competing drug companies. Both
Inc."
were selling the drug Naproxen under separate brand names
(NAPROSYN for plaintiff and APO-NAPROXEN for defendant).
210. Ontario, 65 C.P.R.3d at 178-79.
211. See id. at 179.
212. Id. at 183.

213. Id. at 186.
214. Obviously, unlike the Baywatch court in the U.K., the Ontario court did not
impose any requirement of confusion, though confusion was found in the case.
215. [1987] 1 C.P.R.3d 145 (Fed. Ct. App.).
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Defendant Apotex sent a brochure to hospitals with a chart
containing price comparisons with Syntex's brand of Naproxen. A
major issue was whether this was a "use" of plaintiff's trademark
within the meaning of the statute. As in Clairol, the appeals court
here considered the term "use" in section 22 to be defined by section
4 of the Trade Marks Act,"' and it, too, interpreted the provision
narrowly. The defendant's flyer, though clearly designed to promote
defendant's product, would not be connected in time with the salesince the transfer of goods is separate from the flyer, the flyer does
not give "notice of [its] association" with the goods at the time
possession is transferred."' Accordingly, the court reversed the grant
of a preliminary injunction."8
Similarly, in Cie Generale des Etablissements Michelin-Michelin
& Cie v. C.A.W.-Canada,"9 a union trying to organize Michelin
workers "distributed leaflets, displayed posters and issued
information sheets that reproduced the term MICHELIN."'
Some
of the literature also included a parody of the "Michelin Man"
trademark."' Accepting the Clairolinterpretation of "use"' the court
held that the non-commercial use made of the marks by the union
was not a "use" "for wares or in advertising of services."'
Thus,
there could be no violation of section 22. In addition, the court held
that because the union's activities were aimed at employees, not
customers, there would be no likelihood of depreciation of Michelin's
goodwill. 4
It is worth noting that if one were to overcome the restrictive
"use" provisions of the Canadian statute,' one probably could fend
216. The trial court had granted a preliminary injunction in this case. See Clairol
69 C.P.R.2d 267-68.
217. Syntex, 1 C.P.R.3d at 151.
218. See id. at 154.
219. [1996] 71 C.P.R.3d 348 (Fed. Ct.).
220. Id. at 353.
221. See id. at 355-56.
222. See id. at 361-62.
223. Id. at 363.
224. See id. at 368-69. However, the court ruled in Michelin's favor on a copyright
infringement count, rejecting a parody defense. See id. at 380-81.
225. One commentator has argued that Clairol's restrictive definition of "use"
should be reevaluated and abandoned. See James C. MacInnis, Neither Nice Nor
Easy: Reconsidering ClairolInternationaland Section 22 of the Trade-Marks Act, 13
INTELL. PROP. J. 25 (1998). MacInnis asserts that Clairoloverly restricts the value of
section 22 in protecting marks, and that courts are making artificial distinctions based
on Clairol. See id. at 27, 30-33. He argues for a broad view of use, with a more
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off a parody or free expression defense. Various opinions in
copyright and trademark cases have shown a marked tendency to
place private intellectual property interests ahead of free
expression.'
An interesting twist on the comparative advertising issue is found
in Future Shop Ltd. v. A & B Sound Ltd.' Two large competing
electronics retailers engaged in extensive advertising, and a lawsuit
grew out of a comparative advertisement placed by one of them.
Discussing section 22, the court decided that Clairol rested on the
notion that defendant was trying to lure customers by stressing the
similarity of the two products. Thus, a comparative advertisement
stressing product differences would not seek to lure customers based
Whatever the
on the positive features of the competition.'
involved
which
case,
this
to
its
application
analysis,
plausibility of this
price comparisons, is tenuous. Such comparisons do use the positive
aspects of the competitor-similarity of product-while depreciating
the price (implying that the competitor's goods are overpriced). On
the other hand, this type of analysis demonstrates the unease that
some courts may feel about using dilution protection to prevent
truthful comparative advertising.' As a further analytical oddity, in
Future Shop, even though the court viewed the scope of section 22
rather narrowly, the court found a "fair issue to be tried" under
section 22; it refused a preliminary injunction because the "balance
of conveniences" tipped greatly in favor of the defendant."l
careful focus on "depreciat[ion] ... of the goodwill," analogous to unfair competition
cases, as the means of preventing an overly protective use of section 22. Id. at 36-37.
As he recognizes, this also would require courts to recognize certain new (judicially
created) exceptions, such as parody and "fair comment" to avoid restricting free
speech. Id. at 37-38.
226. See Cie Generale 71 C.P.R.3d 348 (an extensive discussion); Rotisseries St.
Hubert Ltee v. Le Syndicat des Travailleurs (Euses) de la Rotisseries St. Hubert de
Drummondville (C.S.N.) [1986] 17 C.P.R.3d 461 (Que. Super. Ct.); Perrier 70
C.P.R.2d 61.
227. See Future Shop Ltd. v. A & B Sound Ltd. [1994] 55 C.P.R.3d 182 (Sup. Ct.
Br. Col.).
228. See id. at 186.
229. There is some implicit support in the Clairol opinion for the Future Shop
court's approach. As the Future Shop opinion notes, Judge Thurlow in Clairol
opined that a price comparison chart in a store would not violate section 22. See id.

at 187-88.

230. Id. [1994] 55 C.P.R.3d at 189.
231. See id. at 191; see also Aetna Life & Cas. Co. v. Captain Normae Riverboat
Inn Ltd. [1982] 62 C.P.R.2d 16 (H. Ct. J. Ont.) (denying preliminary injunction where
dissatisfied customer of insurance company erected sign stating his views of company
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A cautious approach to section 22 can even be found where the
court did find infringement and passing off. Horn Abbott Ltd. v.
Thurston Hayes Developments Ltd. 2 was a suit brought by the owner
of the TRIVIAL PURSUIT mark for the board game against the
creators of a game called SEXUAL PURSUIT. (The latter was
patterned after the Trivial Pursuit game.) The suit claimed violations
of various provisions of the Trade Marks Act, including section 22.'
The court eventually decided that there was a likelihood of confusion,
thus leading to classic infringement (section 20) as well as passing off
(section 7(b)).' However, the court specifically refused to find a
depreciation of the mark's value.3 5
The willingness to permit section 22 to be used in comparative
advertising situations illustrates its broad scope. The offending use
need not be "unfair" or "dishonest" (unless one perceives truthful
comparative advertising to fit that description), thus exceeding the
scope of the U.K. statute, as well as U.S. law. But the case law
suggests a more careful approach. In particular, the restrictive
interpretation of the "use" requirement, seemingly limiting section 22
to point of sale situations, seriously circumscribes its potential
breadth. Moreover, unlike the FTDA in the United States, section 22
only applies to registeredmarks.
2. The Narrow Remedy-PreliminaryInjunctions:
Taking IrreparableHarm Seriously
Preliminary relief often is important to trademark plaintiffs.
Whether the infringement is by confusion or dilution, the injured
party naturally wants to halt the injury as quickly as possible.
However, a number of cases have demonstrated that preliminary
injunctive relief in Canada is not easily obtained, even when a prima

on sunken ship; court refused preliminary injunction, uncertain about whether
section 22(1) applied to this situation; balance of convenience held to favor

defendant).
232. [1997] 77 C.P.R.3d 10 (Fed. Ct.).
233. See id. at 12.
234. See id. at 22.
235. See id.; but cf Kraft Jacobs Suchard (Schweig) AG v. Hagemeyer Canada
[1998] 78 C.P.R.3d 464, 477 (Ont. Ct. J. (Gen. Div.)) (finding a section 22 violation
after little discussion, based on findings of depreciation of the value of goodwill in the
packaging in a prior confusion analysis; the court did not comment on section 22's
lack of a confusion requirement); Zeneca Ltd. v. Apotex Inc. [1997] 79 C.P.R.3d 399
(Ont. Ct. J. ) (finding of incalculable loss of goodwill as key to granting injunction).
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Consider first
facie violation of the dilution section is made.'
Allergan, Inc. v. Bausch & Lomb Canada, Inc., '7 where plaintiff and
defendant sold competing contact lens cleaning solutions. On its
packages, Bausch & Lomb represented that its product could be used
in conjunction with Allergan's products, which Bausch & Lomb
and
(OMNICARE
by Allergan's trademarks
identified
OXYSEPT).m This would appear to be almost the same situation as
in Clairol. Indeed, defendant conceded that a "serious issue to be
tried" existed under section 22, which is the first step in awarding a
Nevertheless, a preliminary (or
preliminary injunction."
"interlocutory") injunction was denied. The reason: a failure to
demonstrate irreparable harm. The court found that plaintiff's
financial stability was not threatened, and that damages would be an
adequate remedy.'
In contrast to Allergan is Interlogo, AG v. Irwin Toy Ltd.,4
where the court granted a preliminary injunction against defendant,
which made interlocking toy blocks similar to the LEGO and
DUPLO blocks made by plaintiff. The defendant's catalogue stated
that its product "works with LEGO." The court found this to raise "a
strong prima facie case" of a section 22 violation, and said, "The
infringements being, in my view, flagrant, in an industrial or
damages
intellectual property matter, I need not consider whether
242
would provide an adequate remedy for the plaintiffs.
Both Allergan and Interlogo were decided by the Federal Court,
creating an apparent conflict of legal standards. However, the
conflict now seems to have been resolved in favor of the Allergan
approach, at least by the Federal Court. The same Federal Court that
decided these two cases recently stated that, in contrast to the
236. For an extended discussion of this issue, see generally David A. Crerar, "The
Death of the IrreparableInjury Rule" in Canada,36 ALBERTA L. REv. 957 (1998).
237. [1992] 46 C.P.R.3d 372 (Fed. Ct.).
238. See id. Bausch & Lomb put a notice on the package that these were

trademarks of Allergan.
239. Id. at 376. Britain uses a preliminary injunction standard that appears fairly
similar. See American Cyanamid Co. v. Ethicon Ltd., 1975 App. Cas. 396 (appeal
taken from England). A somewhat similar looking prerequisite (though in practice a
more difficult one) exists in U.S. courts for a preliminary injunction. See authorities
cited infra notes 240-46, 256-57.
240. See Allergan [1992] 46 C.P.R.3d at 376-77 ("The evidence in support of a
claim of irreparable harm must be clear and not speculative.").
241. [1985] 3 C.P.R.3d 476 (Fed. Ct.).
242. Id. at 489.
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Interlogo opinion, irreparable harm is not to be presumed in a
trademark infringement case, but rather "must be clear and not
'
speculative."243
The Federal Court noted that earlier decisions
indicating that irreparable harm need not be shown had been
superseded by later cases (all decided after Interlogo) in the Federal
Court of Appeal? Specifically, the court disputed the idea that "the
mere infringement of a . . . trade mark constitutes, of itself,

irreparable harm."245 However, it is worth noting that it has been held
that where the infringement is particularly egregious, "the adequacy
of damages as an alternative and the balance of convenience need not
be further considered." 246
In Mark Anthony Group, Inc. v. Vincor International,Inc.,'7 the
Supreme Court of British Columbia followed the lead of the more
recent Federal Court decisions. Plaintiff, owner of the mark MIKE'S
HARD LEMONADE, sued defendant over the latter's planned sale
of a competing product called JOE HARD ALCOHOLIC
LEMONADE. The court rather summarily determined that a
"serious question to be tried" existed.Y However, citing recent
Federal Court cases, it carefully considered whether there had been a
showing of irreparable harm.249 Plaintiff claimed that potential lost
sales could not be counted accurately, and that loss of goodwill was
not readily quantifiable. However, the court, noting defendant's
testimony indicating how these items could be measured, decided that
243. ITV Technologies, Inc. v. WIC Television Ltd. [1997] 77 C.P.R.3d 495, 499
(Fed. Ct. T.D.) (quoting Syntex Inc. v. Novopharm Ltd. [1991] 36 C.P.R.3d 129, 135
(Fed. Ct. App.)).
244. See id. at 498-99.
245. Id. at 499. The alleged infringer also promised the judge to make efforts to
avoid confusion and keep records in case an accounting of revenues was required.
See id. at 500. The court found this to be another factor weighing against the issuance

of an injunction. See id.
246. Ontario Inc. v. Sony Kabushiki Kaisha [1995] 65 C.P.R.3d 171, 189 (Fed. Ct.
T.D.) (finding violation of section 22, though court's discussion was aimed at section

19).
247. [1998] 80 C.P.R.3d 564 (Sup. Ct. Br. Col.).
248. Id. at 569. The court acknowledged that it was not "engag[ing] in an
extensive review of the merits of the case." Id. It believed this unnecessary to reach
the threshold for a preliminary injunction. Thus, there was virtually no discussion of
the substance of the claim. It should be noted that although the case was decided on
confusion grounds and did not involve section 22, a key element of plaintiff's claim
was that defendant's product would "lead to an erosion of the considerable goodwill
or distinctiveness the plaintiffs have built up in their brand." Id. Thus, dilution was
at least in the background of this case.
249. See Mark Anthony Group [1998] 80 C.P.R.3d at 571-73.
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damages-including lost goodwill-could be determined and
therefore denied a preliminary injunction.'0
The Canadian preliminary injunction standard may be contrasted
with that used in U.S." On the surface, the factors used in the United
States look similar to those used in Canada: probability or likelihood
of success on the merits, irreparable harm, and balance of hardships
favoring the plaintiff's need to preserve the status quo. 2 However,
the application of these factors differs significantly.
In the first place, "likelihood" or "probability" of success is a
higher standard than a serious issue to be tried. As seen above, some
Canadian cases rather quickly conclude that a serious question exists,
and the real issue is irreparable harm and balance of hardships.
However, some federal courts in the United States have used a lesser
standard than likelihood of success: "serious questions" going to the
merits. 3 Indeed, at least one circuit characterized its test as meaning
the following: does the plaintiff "ha[ve] a better than negligible
chance" of succeeding.' Moreover, when the facts are not seriously
in dispute, application of this standard is really a test of the reach of
trademark law more than an estimation of the factual strength of the
case.
A more crucial difference in the standards of the two countries is
the evaluation of irreparable harm.' As we have seen, Canadian
courts consider this factor with great care. In U.S. courts, this factor
250. See id. at 573.; see also Dubiner v. MCA Canada Ltd. [1976] 30 C.P.R.2d 281
(Ont. Ct. J.) (in case brought under section 22, injunction refused; court found no
evidence of harm to plaintiffs, and found balance of convenience did not favor
plaintiffs); Future Shop Ltd. v. A & B Sound Ltd. [1994] 55 C.P.R.3d 182, 190 (Sup.
Ct. Br. Col.) (denying preliminary relief because balance of hardships tipped in
defendant's favor); but cf.Nadel Enterprises Inc. v. Vivitar Canada Ltd. [1994] 60
C.P.R.3d 289,293 (Fed. Ct. T.D.) In Nadel, a passing off action under section 7, both
sides used the same as yet unregistered mark on the same or similar goods. The court
rather conclusorily found that "[c]onfusion, and therefore injury to the plaintiff's
goodwill, is inevitable, injury which is difficult, if not impossible, to translate into
monetary terms." Id.
251. By "U.S. courts" I mean federal courts, where most trademark disputes are
litigated.
252 See MCCARTHY § 30:31. As noted in section 30:32 of MCCARTHY, and
discussed below, a few courts alter some of these factors in some cases.
253. MCCARTHY § 30:32 (citing cases from the Second, Seventh and Ninth
Circuits, e.g. Rodeo Collections Ltd. v. West Seventh, 812 F.2d 1215, 1217 (9th Cir.
1987)).
254. A. J. Canfield Co. v. Vess Beverages, Inc., 796 F.2d 903, 909 (7th Cir. 1986).
255. See Crerar, supra note 236, at 970-71 (noting the difficulty of showing
irreparable harm in intellectual property cases in Canada).
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usually is far less critical, once a likelihood of success is shown. In
many cases, courts have said that irreparable harm is presumed to
exist when a likelihood of success is demonstrated.' Although these
cases deal with traditional infringement by confusion, there is no
reason to believe that dilution should be treated differently."7 Thus,
the road to preliminary relief in Canada may be considerably
bumpier than in the United States.
Thus, in addition to the "use" problem, Canadian procedural law
places other obstacles in the way of any dilution plaintiff. The fairly
searching review of irreparable harm-something notably absent in
U.S. cases-makes preliminary injunctive relief significantly more
difficult to obtain in Canada. Of course, if taken to trial, the broad
scope of section 22(1) ultimately would permit relief in many cases
where no irreparable injury was found.
B. OtherAvenues of Dilution Protection
1. The Scope of Confusion
Even if the "use" limits of section 22 constrain its potential
breadth, trademark owners, particularly those of famous marks, need
not fear a lack of protection in Canada. Other avenues of protection
exist. Unlike the U.K. trademark statute (and the E.U. Directive),
Canada's statute does not have separate standards for "similar" and
"non-similar" goods. Thus, even dissimilar (non-competing) goods
can be subject to an infringement suit if confusion can be shown.
How successful this may be depends on how broadly the courts
interpret the term "confusion." In the United States, confusion
includes such things as confusion of sponsorship and post-sale
confusion."s These two forms of confusion provide broad protection
to trademarks in the United States, sometimes approaching that of
dilution. We have also seen that some passing off cases in the U.K.
256. See, e.g., Eli Lilly & Co. v. Natural Answers, Inc., 233 F.3d 456, 469 (7th Cir.
2000) (holding irreparable harm presumed when dilution shown); Toho Co. v.
William Morrow & Co., 33 F. Supp. 2d 1206, 1210 (C.D. Cal. 1998).
257. See Playboy Entertainment Inc. v. Chuckleberry Publ'g, Inc., 486 F. Supp.
414, 429, 434 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), affd, 687 F.2d 563 (2d Cir. 1982) (describing need to
protect "reputation and good will"-which are also elements of dilution protection).
258. The latter means that the buyer of the infringing goods is not confused.
However, those people who see the buyer with the article may mistakenly believe it
to be the product of another manufacturer. See, e.g., Ferrari S.P.A. Esercizio v.
Roberts, 944 F.2d 1235, 1245 (6th Cir. 1991) (enjoining manufacture of kit to create
replica of Ferrari Testarossa).
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have provided protection that can be likened to confusion of
sponsorship, even strongly resembling dilution.
For Canadian law, the place to start, naturally, is the statute.
Section 6 of the Trade Marks Act defines "confusion." Perhaps most
pertinent is section 6(2), which provides as follows:
(2) The use of a trade-mark causes confusion with another
trade-mark if the use of both trade-marks in the same area would

be likely to lead to the inference that the wares or services
associated with those trade-marks are manufactured, sold, leased,
hired or performed by the same person, whether or not the wares
or services are of the same general class.
Obviously, this definition permits confusion to be found between
non-competing goods (i.e., those that are not "of the same general
class"). It is less clear whether confusion about whether Company 2's
goods or services are "manufactured, sold, leased, hired, or
performed by" Company I encompasses confusion of sponsorship.
After all, such confusion only requires the consumer to think that
Company 2's goods are authorized or approved by Company 1.
Nevertheless, some cases suggest that Canadian courts provide fairly
significant protection to well-known marks under the banner of
confusion.
One example is Glen-Warren ProductionsLtd. v. Gertex Hosiery
Ltd., an appeal from the granting of a trademark registration of the
mark MISS CANADA for women's hosiery which had been used by
the proposed registrant for thirty years. It was opposed by the
organizers of the MISS CANADA beauty pageant, whose mark was
The Registrar of Trademarks rejected the
not registered.'
opposition, but the Federal Court reversed. Obviously, the two
products-women's stockings and beauty pageants-are not
competitive. Nevertheless, the court found that "it is likely that
consumers might assume the organizers of the Miss Canada pageant
had in some way approved, licensed, or sponsored the use of its mark
by a business which markets hosiery under the MISS CANADA
trade mark."' "l The court noted that MISS CANADA "is a famous
trade mark in association with the pageant... and therefore entitled
to broad protection."2' Although falling short of dilution protection
259.
260.
261.
262.

[1990] 29 C.P.R.3d 7 (Fed. Ct.).
See id. The pageant began in 1946.
Id. at 12.
Id. at 14.
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(particularly the broad potential of section 22), such sentiments allow
famous marks a great deal of protection, even against non-competing
goods. One would expect that if a court were convinced that another
company was trying to take advantage of the good will of a famous
mark, it would be able to find confusion of sponsorship. 3
Several other examples of a broad view of confusion under
section 6-the confusion section-of the Canadian statute exist. In
Courvoisier International S.A.R.L. v. Paragon Clothing, Ltd.,' the
Trade Marks Office upheld the opposition to the registration of
"Courvoisier" for clothing, on the grounds that it was likely to cause
confusion with Courvoisier cognac. The Hearing Officer concluded
that "potential customers of" the Courvoisier clothing line would
believe that "the owner of the Courvoisier [cognac] trade mark had,
in some way, approved, licensed or sponsored the applicant's use of
its mark."'
In Conde Nast Publications,Inc. v. Gozian Borthers,
Ltd., the court found that use of the mark VOGUE for costume
jewelry would cause confusion with VOGUE magazine. In Sun Life
Assurance Co. v. Sunlife Juice Ltd.' 7 the owner of the trademark
SUNLIFE, which was used to promote physical fitness in Canada,
sued a juice manufacturer using Sunlife as its mark for juice. Noting
that plaintiffs mark was well known in Canada, the court upheld
plaintiffs claim.'
And in Berry Bros. & Rudd Ltd. v. Planta
9 the Federal Court, reversing
Tabak-Manufactur,"
the Registrar,
upheld an opposition to the registration of CUTTY SARK as a
trademark for tobacco products. The court noted that CUTTY
SARK was well known in Canada as a mark for alcohol, ' and found
that it was likely that consumers would believe that there was a
connection between the tobacco and alcohol products due to the use
263. See Welkowitz, supra note 15, at 540-41.
264. [1984] 77 C.P.R.2d 168 (Hearing Officer, Trade Marks 1984).
265. Id. at 176. The officer also noted the possibility that the applicant did not
choose this mark in good faith. See id.
266. [1980] 49 C.P.R.2d 250 (Fed. Ct. T.D.).
267. [1988] 22 C.P.R.3d 244 (H. Ct. J. Ont.).
268. See id. at 252. The court upheld a claim of passing off, as well as trademark
infringement. With regard to the passing off claim, the court, citing an earlier case
from the U.K., opined that "the inability of the plaintiffs to control such use must
invoke a real injury to their reputation in the mark and hence to their goodwill." Id.
at 252 (citing Lego 9 F.S.R. at 191 (Ch. 1982)). Such concern is very similar to the
underlying rationale of section 22 of the Trade Marks Act.
269. [1980] 53 C.P.R.2d 130 (Fed. Ct.).
270. See Berry Bros. [1980] 53 C.P.R.2d at 140.
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of the same trademark.vl
An interesting use of "confusion" is found in Canada Safeway
Ltd. v. Manitoba Food & Commercial Workers, Local 832.'
Defendant union distributed a pamphlet criticizing the Safeway
company. On the cover of the pamphlet, the union put a letter "S,"
which was known to signify Safeway.'m Although the court ultimately
described its task as determining whether the public would think
"that Safeway is behind the pamphlet's production,"' 4 its language is
often couched in terms of misappropriation. Indeed, the court
appeared uncertain as to how to describe the cause of action, stating
that "it is not easy to fit the facts here into the limits of a[n existing]
nominate tort."
It conceded that "not everyone" would be
confused-but a "significant number" could be. Then it added: "I
agree also that [the union's] use constitutes an unlawful appropriation
of an insignia in which the company has a proprietary interest. ' s
This is misappropriation, rather than confusion. Moreover, the
plaintiff s claim appeared steeped in misappropriation: "The company
contends that in principle it is contrary to law for.., citizens... to
appropriate for their own purposes a mark, insignia or get-ups [i.e.,
trade dress] which is the property of another citizen." There is no
statement of confusion here at all. One could deduce that the court's
conclusion, though couched in familiar confusion language, was
heavily influenced by notions of misappropriation or dilution. There
was no competition, no comparative advertising, and no trademark
use of Safeway's insignia.
But other cases indicate a reluctance to broadly protect wellknown marks against uses on disparate products under a confusion
rationale. 6 A significant example is McDonald's Corp. v. Coffee Hut
Stores Ltd.' There, the McDonald's Corporation, well known for its
fast food franchises, opposed registration of the mark MCBEANS for
271. See id. at 141-43. The court noted that the prospective registrant intended to
advertise its pipe tobacco as being flavored with whiskey, which would enhance the
likelihood of confusion. See id. at 143-44.
272. [1983] 73 C.P.R.2d 234.

273. See id. at 235.
274. Id. at 236.
275. Id.
276. A discussion of several cases can be found in Theresa Corneau & Sheila
Jennings Linehan, Such Great Names as These: Protection of Famous Trade Marks
Under the CanadianTrade Marks Act [1995] 11 E.I.P.R 531.
277. [1994] 55 C.P.R.3d 463 (Fed. Ct. 1994), affd [1996] 68 C.P.R.3d 168 (Fed. Ct.
App. 1996).
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use in association with "coffee makers and accessories, namely, coffee
cups, coffee mugs, coffee pots, coffee grinders, coffee filters, electric
coffee makers, souvenir coffee spoons, coffee, coffee beans and tea;"
as well as to the services of the operation of a business dealing in the
sale of these wares.28
However, the court rejected the opposition.
Although it
acknowledged that McDonald's was a well-known mark, it found no
likelihood of confusion; it determined that the target markets were
different and that customers would not be likely to think that
McBeans was connected to McDonald's.79
More recently, in Jaguar Cars Ltd. v. Remo Imports Ltd.-Les
Importations Remo Ltee,' the Trade Marks Opposition Board
rejected an opposition by the owner of the Jaguar mark for cars
(among other items)"' to a registration of JAGUAR for use on
briefcases. Among the findings by the Board was the following
statement:
[C]onsidering the limited number of cars sold under the mark
JAGUAR in Canada (never more than 2,122 annually), and the
absence of evidence of advertising or promotion under the mark,

the opponent's evidence is, in my view, far from sufficient for me to
conclude that the opponent's mark JAGUAR is a famous mark in
Canada.m
The hearing judge went on to conclude:
I find that the applicant has met the onus on it to establish that, on
a balance of probabilities, the average consumer would not believe,
as a matter of first impression and imperfect recollection, that
278. Id. at 466.
279. See id. at 479. The court stated,
If one looks at McDonald's business, it directs its advertising and decor
towards children; in fact one of its registered trade marks relates to a clown,
RONALD MCDONALD. MCBEANS is not seeking the children's market.
MCBEANS is in the business of gourmet coffee and at that, it is at the high
end of the trade.
Id. Of course, in this case the second user's mark was not identical to McDonald'sit had only the "Mc" prefix. However, in U.S. cases, that has sufficed. See, e.g.,
McDonald's Corp. v. Druck and Gerner, DDS, P.C., 814 F. Supp. 1127, 1139
(N.D.N.Y. 1993) (enjoining use of "McDental" by dentist); Quality Inns Int'l, Inc. v.
McDonald's Corp., 695 F. Supp. 198, 221-22 (D. Md. 1988) (enjoining use of
"McSleep" by hotel).
280. [1998] 82 C.P.R.3d 557 (Trade Marks Opposition Bd. 1998).
281. Id. at 562. The board listed a number of other items sold by the opponent
using the Jaguar trademark.
282. Id. at 563.
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Remo's briefcases sold under the mark JAGUAR were approved,
licensed, or sponsored by the opponent.m
Thus, it is apparent that confusion may not be strong protection
in Canada, particularly for foreign companies that, while well known,
do not have extensive sales in Canada. One must conclude that the
law is rather unsettled as to whether and to what extent companies
can rely on a broad conception of confusion to protect their marks.
As noted at the outset, section 6, unlike its British counterpart, does
not require that the confusingly similar mark be on the same or
similar goods. On the other hand, courts appear somewhat reluctant
to assume that consumers will automatically perceive a connection
between companies with the same marks on different goods,
especially when they are not deemed "famous" in Canada.
2. Unfair Competition:A DilutionAlternative?
As we have seen, section 22 and, in some cases, even the
traditional confusion doctrine under section 6 provide protection
against a broad range of potential unauthorized uses of a trademark.
However, there are limits to what the statute prohibits. For instance,
section 22 by its terms only applies to registeredmarks. Unregistered
marks are not protected by this section. And the "use" limitation
restricts the reach of the section as well. Thus, one may ask whether
there is an equivalent of the British common law doctrine of passing
off that could be used to broadly attack non-confusing uses of
another's trademark in Canada. Such an action could be brought
under section 7 of the Canadian statute. It provides as follows:
7. No person shall
(a) make a false or misleading statement tending to discredit the
business, wares or services of a competitor;
(b) direct public attention to his wares, services or business in such
283. Id. at 568-69. The Jaguarcase also illustrates the continued strong influence

of territoriality. The Board's pointed reference to the small number of Canadian
sales shows that it took a narrow view of protection for a mark that it viewed as not
extensively used in Canada. See also Esprit Int'l v. Alcohol Countermeasure Sys.
Corp. [1997] 84 C.P.R.3d 89, 100 (Trade Marks Hearing Officer 1997) (rejecting
opposition by maker of ESPRIT clothing to registration of Esprit mark for alcohol
testing devices). Responding to argument that the prospective use would damage
opponent's reputation and good will, the Espritcourt stated, "The likelihood that the
reputation of a mark would suffer harm does not assist in a determination about
whether confusion arises. Rather, in my view, damage to reputation would be a
result of confusion having arisen." Id.
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a way as to cause or be likely to cause confusion in Canada, at the
time he commenced so to direct attention to them, between his
wares, services or business and the wares, services or business of
another;
(c) pass off other wares or services as and for those ordered or
requested;

(d) make use, in association with wares or services, of any
description that is false in a material respect and likely to mislead
the public as to
(i) the character, quality, quantity or composition,
(ii) the geographical origin, or
(iii) the mode of the manufacture, production or performance of
the wares or services; or
(e) do any other act or adopt any other business practice contrary
to honest industrial or commercial usage in Canada.
Subsections (a) through (d) appear to be based on traditional
confusion and/or deception doctrines. Obviously, sections 7(b) and
(c) allow a passing off claim, but there is no indication that such a
claim would be broader in scope than an action under section 6 in
terms of confusion.' On its face, section 7(e) appears likely to have a
very broad scope, since it encompasses any "[dis]honest" business
practice. Given the broad scope of section 22, one certainly could
argue that dilution of another's trademark is "contrary to honest
industrial or commercial usage in Canada." However, that avenue to
broad protection appears to be foreclosed. In MacDonaldv. Vapour
Canada Ltd., the Supreme Court of Canada ruled that section 7(e)
was an unconstitutional exercise of legislative authority. MacDonald
was a case about a theft of trade secrets. The Supreme Court
believed that such a private tort was left to provincial legislatures,
rather than the federal Parliament. On the other hand, the opinion
left open the possibility that section 7 could be upheld if it applied to
matters clearly within national authority-such as patents, copyrights

and trademarks.'

284.
[1999]
285.
286.

See, e.g., Greystone Capital Management Inc. v. Greystone Properties Ltd.
87 C.P.R.3d 43, 50 (section 7(b) codifies the common law passing off action).
[1976] 22 C.P.R.2d 1.
See MacDonald[1976] 22 C.P.R.2d at 28-30, 34.
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In fact, citing the language in MacDonald, the Federal Court of
Appeal held that section 7(b) was constitutional as a regulation of
trademark.
Thus, one might infer that a non-confusion based
trademark infringement theory could be upheld under section 7(e) on
the same basis. Since section 22 makes the use of another's mark in a
manner that depreciates "the value of [its] goodwill" an actionable
matter, it would seem also to be contrary to "honest industrial or
commercial usage" as defined in section 7(e). However, the case law
does not support this argument.
In a short opinion, the Federal Court of Appeal held, in
Bousquet v. Barmish Inc.,' that section 7(e) cannot provide an
independent basis for a trademark infringement claim. This ruling
was followed in Levi Strauss & Co. v. L.A. Jazz Ltee. and in Figgie
InternationalInc. v. Schoettler.'
This failure to seize the opening provided in MacDonald is
interesting. Perhaps the breadth of protection for confusion,
discussed above, is deemed sufficient for unregistered marks.
However, given the globalization of trade and the increased desire of
mark owners for property-like protection, one might have thought the
courts could reach out and use section 7(e) to broaden the available
avenues of trademark protection. Moreover, although industrial
designs can be protected in Canada under a separate law, 9' that
protection, like similar protection in Britain (and design patent
protection in the United States) is limited in time. Thus, we have, in
effect, a judicial reluctance to extend the common law action for
287. See Asbjorn Horgard A/S v. Gibbs/Nortac Indus. Ltd. [1987] 14 C.P.R.3d 308
(Fed. Ct. App. 1987).
288. [1993] 46 C.P.R.3d 510 (Fed. Ct. App. 1993).
289. [1995] 61 C.P.R.3d 302 (Fed. Ct. 1995). Although this case was a trademark

infringement action, the section 7(e) claim was a counterclaim that did not directly
involve a trademark infringement allegation.
290. [1994] 53 C.P.R.3d 450, 458 (Fed. Ct. T.D.). This case is particularly
interesting because the judge had previously ruled, in McCabe v. Yamamoto & Co.
(America) [1989] 23 C.P.R.3d 498, 506-08 (Fed. Ct. T.D.), that section 7(e) was

constitutional to the extent that it dealt with claims of patent, trademark or copyright
infringement. (The judge did not refer to his earlier ruling in the McCabe opinion.)

Even before the ruling in MacDonald,it had been held that section 7(e) offered no
additional protection for trademark infringement from that offered by section 7(a)(d). See Eldon Indus., Inc. v. Reliable Toy Co. [1965] 48 C.P.R. 109, 124 (Ont. Ct.
App. 1965); see also Ital-Press Ltd. v. Sicoli [1999] 86 C.P.R.3d 129, 179 (Fed. Ct.
T.D.) (Federal Court lacks jurisdiction over common law claim if not made pursuant
to "trade marks scheme" under section 7).
291. See R.S. 1985, c. 1-9.
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passing off into areas beyond its traditional underpinnings of unfair
competition and deceit.292
Finally, consider Walt Disney Productions v. FantasylandHotel
Inc.,' a common law passing off action by Disney against the
proprietor of a hotel called the "Fantasyland Hotel." Disney asserted
that the primary issue was whether "there [is] likely to be a
depreciation of the goodwill of [Disney] in its name
FANTASYLAND should the [defendant] continue to operate a hotel
under that name.'294
Notably, there is no mention here of confusion. However, the
appeals court upheld the trial judge's finding that Disney had no
goodwill in the name FANTASYLAND as it relates to hotels.'
Moreover, although it did not dispute the possibility that passing off
could be based on a theory of confusion of sponsorship or
endorsement,' the court stated that "misrepresentation or confusion
is still a required element."'2 Further, Disney argued that "the name
Fantasyland is as distinctive and deserving of protection as
champagne," citing the Taittinger v. Allbev case from the U.K.
However, the court did not uphold this apparent attempt to inject a
dilution argument into a passing off case.9

292. The Quebec Superior Court, in Rotisseries St.-Hubert Ltee v. Le Syndicat des
Travailleurs (Euses) de la Rotisserie St.-Hubert de Drummondville [1986] 17 C.P.R.3d
461 (Que. Super. Ct.), also refused relief under section 7(e), citing MacDonald. In
the same opinion, the court stated that relief parallel to "article 7" could be obtained
under provincial law. Id. Whether that means section 7 as a whole or section 7(e) in
particular was not entirely clear. However, the plaintiff also claimed relief under
section 22, losing because of the "use" requirement in Clairol,discussed above. (The
defendant was a union and used the mark in a parody of the company, which sued for
both copyright and trademark infringement.) Section 22 does not require confusion.
Thus, it may be that provincial law would allow relief without a showing of confusion.
The plaintiffs lost on the provincial law ground only because of a failure to show
damages. (The report of this case is in French, except the headnotes, and I am
indebted to my colleague, Calvin Peeler, for his assistance in translating the case.)
293. [1996] 67 C.P.R.3d 444 (Alb. Ct. App.).
294. Id. at 450. The hotel was next to an amusement area, also called Fantasyland,
which had been enjoined from using the name.
295. See id. at 451.
296. See id. at 450-51 (referring to Greystone Capital Management v. Greystone
Properties Ltd. [1996] 64 C.P.R.3d 496 (Br. C. Sup. Ct.)).
297. Id.
298. Greystone [1996] 64 C.P.R.3d 496.
299. See Disney [1996] 67 C.P.R.3d at 451.
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C. Summary: Broad Potential, But with Hesitation
There does not appear to be a concerted effort to use dilution
doctrine in reported Canadian cases. Although some cases have
indicated that section 22 could have a broad impact (applying to
marks that are scarcely known, and applying to comparative
advertising), the obstacle of "use" and the relative difficulty of
obtaining a preliminary injunction have blunted the effect of the
section. Passing off cases, have not filled the void-particularly in
light of the unconstitutionality of the best support for dilution, section
7(e). Mark owners are not without protection, of course. Canadian
cases interpret "confusion" broadly enough to encompass other than
strict source confusion. Even here, however, the cases are somewhat
uneven in their willingness to give strong protection. In sum, the
results are somewhat mixed, with no clear trend in view.'

Conclusion
It is apparent that neither Canada nor the U.K. has jumped into
the dilution pool with both feet. Indeed, (to continue with the
metaphor) it would appear that they have simply put their toes in the
water. It is particularly understandable in the case of Great Britain
for several reasons. In the first place, dilution historically has not
played an integral role in British trademark law. Although some
passing off cases sounded very much like dilution cases, the results of
the passing off cases are not consistent" and the numbers are not
sufficient to demonstrate that dilution was an important facet of
British law. Under the 1938 Trade Marks Act, there was no provision
for a dilution claim. The 1994 Act is really the first explicit attempt to
300. An unwillingness to give broad protection can also be found in another area
of Canadian trademark law-protecting product configurations. In Thomas & Betts,
Ltd. v. Panduit Corp. [1997] 74 C.P.R.3d 185 (Fed. Ct. T.D.) (this case is apparently
on appeal to the Federal Court of Appeal, see Kirkbi AG v. Ritvik Holdings Inc., 81
[1998] C.P.R.3d 289, 302 (Fed. Ct. T.D.)), the Federal Court dismissed an action
claiming, inter alia, a trademark in the shape of the head of a nylon cable tie. Among
other things, the court (citing various U.S. cases) noted that where the plaintiff had a
patent on its product that had expired, it would be inappropriate to permit the use of
trademark law to extend the patent. See id. at 198. Nor would the court permit the
plaintiff to "rely on any distinctiveness its dress up may have acquired during the
period of the monopoly to deny the public the full use of the invention disclosed in its
expired patent." Id. at 199. A later Federal Court case, however, has noted that, to
some extent, the Thomas & Betts court relied on a U.S. district court decision
between the same parties that was reversed on appeal. See Kirkbi AG v. Ritvik
Holdings Inc., 81 C.P.R.3d at 302.
301. See discussion of cases supra Parts II.A. and II.D.2.
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bring dilution into Britain's trademark regime. Thus, its courts are in
unfamiliar territory when they confront the new statute.
Second, as discussed in the Wagamama opinion, the statute is
primarily the product of the E.U.'s legislative process, not the
ordinary British Parliamentary process.
This means that
interpretation is more difficult. Courts must attempt to discern E.U.
policy, and may not be able to use ordinary interpretive devices.
Third, both the courts and the U.K. trademark office seem to
comprehend that dilution is a potentially powerful form of trademark
protection. As with many cases in the United States, they may
recognize that prudence is necessary, lest dilution swallow up the
traditional concern for consumer protection in favor of a pure
property based regime, with no time limitation on the rights granted.
In this regard, it is interesting to note that the few ECJ cases on this
subject also have not interpreted the trademark Directive
expansively. Rather, there seems to be a concern that dilution not be
used in a manner that would undercut the competitive, free trade
policies of the E.U.
Canada's dilution statute is much older than Britain's, and has a
potentially broader reach-lacking the limitation of marks with a
"reputation" and use "without due cause." Some of the cases under
its dilution section, such as the union cases against management and
the "Pierre Eh!" water parody, demonstrate this long reach.
Nevertheless, Canada's processes, particularly regarding preliminary
relief, temper the reach of the statute, as does the "use" requirement
imposed by the Clairol opinion. These limits may reflect a broader
concern that businesses not too easily be able to use injunctions under
the statute to limit competition between businesses.'
From a U.S. perspective, what can be learned from these two
legal regimes? Perhaps most importantly, we can see that it is not
necessary for our courts and legislatures to believe that they must
give far greater trademark protection lest the United States be seen as
behind the times in the international circle of trademark protection.
Our own federal dilution statute is still at an early stage in its
interpretation, and we can watch the interpretation of other
countries' statutes for interpretive clues and trends. Although the
302. In this regard, it is interesting to note that unions (who are not business
competitors, though they are adversaries) seemed to be less successful than ordinary
competitors in staving off remedial measures-even if the remedy was for copyright
violations. However, the cases discussed are hardly so numerous as to allow for
satisfactory generalizations.
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Baywatch case in the U.K. may have overstepped by imposing a
requirement of confusion, the British trademark office appears to be
making an attempt to implement the probable intent of the statute
while avoiding the potentially overarching power of trademark
dilution. Its decisions demonstrate that dilution indeed has limits.
The Oasis registration opinion is notable here. The trademark
office was unwilling to assume that the use of a well-known mark
(EVEREADY) on unrelated products that might stir controversycondoms and other contraceptives-would automatically cause harm
to the better known user and its mark. Courts in the United States
would do well to emulate that caution and not assume that other uses
will cause dilution of a "famous" mark. ' Our courts also may wish to
consider whether Congress intended to disrupt competitive structures
when it passed the FTDA.
Whether U.S. courts would be willing to consider the Canadian
model for preliminary injunctions is doubtful. But the Canadian
courts' continued adherence to the "use" limitation may be more
evidence of caution similar to that shown in the British cases.
As the United States and United States-based mark owners
venture more and more into the world market, we will need to be
aware of trends and analyze them carefully. With dilution, we may
wish to recognize that it is a two edged (and perhaps three edged)
sword. Trademark protection serves a valid and useful purpose, both
for consumers and sellers. On the other hand, over-protection is not
in the public interest. Moreover, we should remember that U.S.
companies are not the only trademark owners in the world and the
strong rights we give to trademarks (which may be taken advantage
of by foreign registrants under section 44 of the Lanham Act),04 and
the rights granted by other countries to their mark owners, can be
used against U.S. companies just as easily as they can be used in their
favor. Thus, countries may eventually find it in their interests to
temper the urge for strong mark protection in order to preserve local
303. Oasis Stores [1998] R.P.D. & T.M. 631 (Trade Marks Registry 1998).
304. The case of Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah
Div. of Travel Dev., 170 F.3d 449 (4th Cir. 1999), may be an example of that caution
by requiring a showing of some actual evidence of harm. Id. at 458-61; see also
William Marroletti, Dilution, Confusion, or Delusion? The Need for a Clear
InternationalStandard to Determine Trademark Dilution, 25 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L.
659 (1999) (arguing that Ringling should be applied internationally); but cf. Nabisco,
Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 223-25 (2d Cir. 1999) (rejecting the Ringling

approach).
305. See 15 U.S.C. § 1126.
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competitive interests. In any event, the evolution of international
dilution standards is a process well worth following.

